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CHAPTER I
BEFORE CONSIDERING RODRIGUFZ

Historical Synopsis of the Relationship- Education, Finance and the Courts 1973-93
In the early spring of 1973, educators looked hopefully towards the United States
Supreme Court for guidance in resolving school finance issues. 1 After all, nearly twenty
years earlier, the Court had taken leadership roles, in both education and equal rights,
when it declared in Brown v. Board of Education2 that "separate, but equal"3 education
was unconstitutional.4 On March 23, 1973 the Supreme Court's leadership, for all
effective purposes, came to a screeching halt with the Rodriguez decision. In Rodriguez,
the Court held that education was not a fundamental right under the federal Constitution.
Furthermore, the Court ruled that states could continue to determine their own methods for
raising funds for schools, even if it meant using local property taxes as a major source of
revenue.
At first, the decision was interpreted as "a crushing blow to a movement that was
trying to achieve education reform through judicial action. "5 Advocates of school finance
reform feared this setback might stop the entire movement and they did so with good

1
15.

Linda Mathews, "Rodriguez and Friends," Race Relations Reporter (July 1973):

2

Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed. 873.

3

Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 16 S.Ct. 1138, 41 L.Ed. 256 (1896).

4

Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed. 873 (1954).

5
15.

Linda Mathews, "Rodriguez and Friends," Race Relations Reporter (July 1973):

4

opportunity," which have a particular meaning to those in the education community.
Attorneys and judges may have some idea about these terms, but case law demonstrates
that although they might define these terms similarly, they think about them differently.
Early on in the education finance cases, it was almost as though educators spoke
one "language" and courts spoke another.

Educators would present their arguments in

"eduspeak" and courts would hand down their decisions in "legalese." As time passed,
and more and more cases were filed, each group became increasingly familiar with the
other's "language," but it still was not their "native tongue." The communication problem
was even more compounded because the issues to be resolved dealt with finance, which
had its own "language," as well. Thus, in order to understand the history of the period,
one may need not only a road map, but also a translator, for understanding the aspects of
legal, educational, and financial language that were commonly used is essential to
understanding this period in history.
Thus, although this is a financial history work, much of this dissertation focuses on
language and communication. This first chapter paves the way for later chapters by
defining terms (from law, education and finance) that are used throughout the dissertation.
It then discusses how school finance matters came to be addressed in court, in the first

place. The second chapter discusses the facts and ruling in the Rodriguez case. The third
chapter highlights some ouside aspects that may have influenced the decision, even though
they were not directly mentioned in the case.outlines in brief the major state-court school
finance cases that followed Rodriguez. The fourth chapter analyzes thepost-Rodriguez
state court decisions, through description, comparison and contrast, emphasizing what the
cases meant for the country as a whole. Finally, the fifth chapter draws conclusions about
this period in history and offers suggestions to reformers who would like to see changes in
school finance.

5
Legal Preliminaries
The Constitution of the United States
Fundamental Rights and the Bill of Rights.
Education is not mentioned in the United States Constitution.13 It is not now, nor
was it from 1973 to 1993, in legal terms, a "fundamental right" under the federal
Constitution.1 4 Fundamental rights are those rights that are granted implicitly or explicitly
in the United States Constitution and its amendments.IS This means that a fundamental
right is either written about in the text of the Constitution, like the right to vote, or it is
implied from other language, such as the right to privacy.

As a practical matter,

fundamental rights include most of the guarantees of the Bill of Rights, which are the first
ten amendments to the Constitution.

I6

The Fourteenth Amendment and Equal Protection.
The United States Constitution was crafted to ensure the preservation of individual
rights. Together with the Bill of Rights, the Constitution limits the powers of government
and guarantees fundamental liberties for Americans.17

Initially, the Bill of Rights was

applicable only to the federal government, not to individual state governments. Thus, in
the early years of United States history, the powers of a state government were limited by
respective bills of rights within the context of its own state constitution, rather than by the
federal Bill of Rights. This process made states the final authority when interpreting their
13
Although there is evidence that education was important to the framers of the
Constitution, nonetheless they apparently chose not to include it.
14
It is not a fundamental right under most state constitutions (even though states had
the option of making it so, after Rodriguez.)
15

San Antonio v. Rodriguez, 411 US. 1, 36 L.Ed 2d 16, 93 S.Ct 1278 (1973).

16
John E. Nowak and Ronald D. Rotonda, Constitutional Law, Hornbook Series,
5th ed. (St. Paul, Minnesota: West Publishing Co., 1995), 390.
17
For example, among other rights, the Bill of Rights recognizes the rights to free
speech, a speedy trial, and freedom of religion ,while it prohibits such governmental
actions as unreasonable searches and seizures and excessive bail.
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own constitutions, as long as no federal law was involved.

With the adoption of the

fourteenth amendment in 1868, however, federal constitutional controls were extended to
state governments as weU.18
For the purposes of this dissertation, the fourteenth amendment is important not
only because it extends the Bill of Rights to actions against state governments, but also
because it contains a phrase that has come to be known as the equal protection clause.
The fourteenth amendment provides, in part, that "No state shall ... deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." 19 The equal protection clause has
come to be an important guarantor of rights in many areas. In fact, "[i]n recent years the
equal protection guarantee has become the single most important concept in the United
States Constitution for the protection of individual rights. 11 20
The equal protection clause provides two guarantees. First, it promises that all
individuals will be treated fairly when they are exercising their fundamental rights.21
(Again, education is not a fundamental right.) Secondly, it assures that the government22
will treat similarly situated individuals in a similar matter. 23
Even with the equal protection clause, however, the government is not required to
treat everyone equally. As shocking and un-American as it may sound, local, state, and
18
John E. Nowak and Ronald D. Rotonda, Constitutional Law, Hornbook Series,
5th ed. (St. Paul, Minnesota: West Publishing Co., 1995), 595.
19

Constitution of the United States of America, Amendment XIV, Section 1.

20
John E. Nowak and Ronald D. Rotonda, Constitutional Law, Hombook Series,
5th ed. (St. Paul, Minnesota: West Publishing Co., 1995), 595.
21

Ibid.

22
The concept of "equal protection" under the fourteenth amendment applies to state
and local governments only. Federal laws are tested under the same "equal protection"
standards but through the implied guarantee of the fifth amendment. See John E. Nowak
and Ronald D. Rotonda, Constitutional Law, Hornbook Series, 5th ed., (St. Paul,
Minnesota: West Publishing Co., 1995), 596.
23
John E. Nowak and Ronald D. Rotonda, Constitutional Law, Hombook Series,
5th ed. (St. Paul, Minnesota: West Publishing Co., 1995), 597.
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federal government bodies are entitled to discriminate among people; i.e., while it may
seem odd to the non-lawyer, discrimination in and of itself is not illegal. For example, a
state may decide that only people with certain qualifications can drive a truck, practice
medicine, or teach elementary school.24

The equal protection clause ensures, however,

that this ability to discriminate may not be used arbitrarily.25
Tests for constitutionality under the equal protection clause.

With the passage of

time, as challenges to the equal protection clause were filed, the Supreme Court evolved a
series oftests to determine whether the equal protection clause had been violated.26

From

1973 to 1993, the Supreme Court used three tests to determine whether or not a law was in
violation of the equal protection clause.2 7 Although the law changes constantly, currently
all of these three tests are still in use.
•The Rational Relationship Test
The first test used during this period is known as the rational relationship test.

The

rational relationship test requires only that the government's reason for classifying or
discriminating against an individual bears a rational relationship to a legitimate government
interest.28 As long as it is arguable that there is a rational relationship to such an interest, a

24
Allan R. Odden and Lawrence 0. Picus, School Finance: A Policy Perspective.
(St. Louis, Missouri: McGraw-Hill, 1992), 22.
25
John E Nowak and Ronald D. Rotonda, Constitutional Law, Hornbook Series, 5th
ed., (St. Paul, Minnesota: West Publishing Co., 1995), 597.
26
Allan R. Odden and Lawrence 0. Picus, School Finance: A Policy Perspective.
(St. Louis, Missouri: McGraw-Hill, 1992), 22.
27
Many sources, including several of the articles and notes cited here, list only two
tests for equal protection, the rational relationship test and the strict scrutiny test. Although
all school finance cases brought under equal protection clauses have bee resolved with one
of these two tests, there are, in fact, three tests for determining whether a law violates
equal protection.
28

See Pennel v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 108 S. Ct. 849, 99 L.Ed.2d 1 (1988).
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court should not interfere with the classification;2 9 i.e, the court should not declare the law
unconstitutional.
• The Strict Scrutiny Test
The second test is known as the strict scrutiny test. This test is far more rigorous
than the rational relationship test. With the strict scrutiny test, the government must show
that it is discriminating (or classifying) because it has a compelling interest or that it is
pursuing an overriding end.

In addition, the relationship between the government's

classification and its interest must be close.
When a claim is brought under the auspices of the equal protection clause, the court
will review the claim if it falls into one of two categories. The first category consists of
people who are attempting to exercise their fundamental rights.30

The second category

consists of people who are members of a "suspect class." A member of a suspect class is
one who (1) is "saddled with such disabilities"; or 2) has been subject to "a history of
purposeful unequal treatment"; or who 3) has been "relegated to a position of political
powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoitarian political
process. 113 l
• The Intermediate Scrutiny Test
Just as its name suggests, the constitutional standards for the intermediate scrutiny
test, fall in between those of the rational relationship test and the strict scrutiny test. The
intermediate scrutiny test was not used to determine the outcome of school finance
challenges under the federal equal protection clause during the 1973-93 period.
Consequently, it will not be emphasized in this dissertation. Nonetheless, it is important
to note that the option of the intermediate scrutiny test became available to courts during this

29
John E. Nowak and Ronald D. Rotonda, Constitutional Law, Hornbook Series,
5th ed. (St. Paul, Minnesota: West Publishing Co., 1995), 597.
30

Ibid.

31

San Antonio v. Rodriguez, 411US1, 36 L Ed 2d 16, 40.

9

period.32 Furthermore, the courts' failure to use the intermediate scrutiny test during this
period does not necessarily prohibit the use of this test in future education finance cases.

32
Intermediate scrutiny developed after the 1973 Rodriguez decision. See Craig v.
Boren 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
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Purpose of U.S. Courts
United States courts perform two functions.

First, they settle disputes between

parties. This is their most common function are the most common cases and involves
selecting and applying the proper law to a particular set of facts. Such disputes may be
criminal or civil. For example, a dispute may occur between two individuals, two
companies, or, as in the case of a criminal violation, the people of a governmental body
(such as a state) and the alleged offender.

The second function of courts is to hear

arguments for or against the very constitutionality of a law or its application. For example,
the plaintiff (the person or entity bringing the charges) may argue either (1) that a particular
law should never have been passed in the first place because it conflicts with the rights
guaranteed under the Constitution or (2) that the law itself may be constitutional, but the
way in which the law has been applied to a particular set of facts is not. In both types of
cases, a court may decide whether a law is in violation of the state or federal constitution.33
Judicial Considerations
Judicial Review
Judicial review is the supervisory power of United States Courts to declare national
and state legislation unconstitutional. It is perhaps the United States' greatest contribution
to the science and art of govemment.3 4

In his book The Constitution and American

Education, Arvel A. Morris discusses at least three functions of judicial review, each of
which he claims is vital to the success of the American government. First, he asserts that
although the Supreme Court has only the power to say that a law is unconstitutional, and
not to change the law directly, the mere declaration of unconstitutionality carries a great deal
of weight with the public. Likewise, with a declaration of constitutionality, citizens often
view the Court's opinion as a "stamp of legitimacy" upon a law or practice.

Secondly,

33
Arval A. Morris, The Constitution and American Education (St. Paul, Minnesota:
West Publishing Co., 1980), 29.
34

Ibid.
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Morris notes that judicial review is an essential component in the triangular system of
checks and balances. With the power of judicial review, courts limit the power of the
executive and legislative branches by ensuring that these branches do not act with authority
beyond that which is granted to them in the Constitution. Finally, Morris claims that "by
fearlessly upholding a humane interpretation of our Constitution, the Supreme Court
preserves, and requires the other branches of government to observe our great
constitutional ideal of human dignity which otherwise might be forgotten. "35
Judicial Activism
Indeed, it is the duty of the judicial branch of the government to uphold the
Constitution and the laws of the United States; however, it is not the duty of this branch to
rewrite the law. At times, courts have been known to push their powers to the limit by
engaging in judicial activism. Judicial activism is "marked by decisions calling for social
engineering and occasionally these decisions represent intrusions into legislative and
executive matters. 11 36
Judicial Restraint
When a court believes that it may be on the verge of encroaching upon the duty of
another branch of government, it should choose to exercise judicial restraint.

Judicial

restraint simply means that the court will not perform the duties of the legislative and
executive branches of government. It will not create the law and it will not enforce the
law; it will only interpret the law .37 Some would argue that just as with judicial activism,
judicial restraint can be abused. This could happen when courts refuse to become involved
in matters where its guidance could be helpful, such as in education finance matters.

35

Ibid. at 80.

36
Black's Law Dictionary, 5th ed., 1979, (St. Paul, Minnesota: West Publishing
Co.,) 11th reprint 1987, 760.
37
John E. Nowak and Ronald D. Rotonda, Constitutional Law, Horn book Series,
5th ed. (St. Paul, Minnesota: West Publishing Co., 1995), 597.
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Education Terminology
Introduction
Educators like the judiciary, also seek to preserve the idea of human dignity, but
most frequently, they do so in the classroom rather than the courtroom. Not surprisingly,
educators use different terminology as well. Many of the terms used by educators have
crossed over into the language of legal briefs and judicial opinions. In fact, some of the
educational terminology was created in anticipation of litigation. Nonetheless, in order to
fully understand the background of the legal arguments that employ these terms, it is
important to remember that these words and phrases have meaning to professionals outside
the courtroom.
Local Control
Local control is one such phrase. The term is, in some sense, self-explanatory,
meaning that issues are to be resolved within the borders of an immediate geographic area,
rather than at any larger level. For example, a particular issue may be decided at a county
level, rather than at a state level, or to go even further, the issue may then be further
localized as to how it affects a particular city, a community, or even a neighborhood within
that community. The concept of local control is not exclusive to education; however,
historically, education and local control have had a very long relationship in the United
States.

Perhaps as a consequence, local control issues are especially sensitive in

education.38
Schools were first established in the United States on a local basis;39 thus, it was
somewhat natural for them to be controlled at the local level.

For schools, the idea of

local control involves more than just financial matters; it involves the entire concept of

38
Rochelle Sharpe, "Federal Education Law Becomes Hot Target of Wary
Conservatives," Wall Street Journal, 30 August 1995, p. l(A).

39
Percy E. Burrup, Vern Brimley Jr. and Rulon R. Garfield, Financing Education in
a Oimate of Change (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1988), 162.
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formal education.

Curriculum, library book selection, teacher retention, and school

policies (from student dress to student drinking) are all subject to the influence of local
control.

Historically, these elements of education, along with many others, have been

controlled by local school boards,40 which are comprised of community members.
In a note in the 1991 Vanderbilt Law Review, entitled "State Constitutional
Analyses of Public School Finance Reform Cases: Myth or Methodology?" the author
argues against the "rhetoric of local control,"41 but in doing so, points out some of the
legitimate arguments for the preservation of local control. For example, parents who pour
time, energy, and money into their local community school have a strong interest in that
school.

"[P]arents have an intimate and powerful interest in what and in how their

children are taught, and even a possibility of reduced control raises concerns. "4 2
Likewise, the community also has a strong interest in maintaining local control.
"Preserving local fiscal autonomy against state domination is akin to protection of
individual control over one's person and over the use of one's private property against
government constraint. "43

Furthermore, different communities have different concerns,

standards of living, and behavioral codes.

Community-based concepts such as these

naturally overlap into the microcosm of the local school.
Equal Educational Opportunity
Equal educational opportunity is "the basic principle that wealth should not
determine the quality of public education."44

Much of the credit for developing the

Rochelle Sharpe, "Federal Education Law Becomes Hot Target of Wary
Conservatives," Wall StreetJoumal, 30 August 1995, p. l(A).

40

41
Jonathan Banks, "State Constitutional Analyses of Public School Finance Reform
Cases: Myth or Methodology?" 45 Vandertbilt Law Review 159 ( 1991)
42

Ibid. at 160.

43

Ibid. at 129.

44
John Coons, Stephan D. Sugarman and William H. Clune III. Private Wealth and
Public Education, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1970) 33.
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concept of equal educational opportunity has been given to a former Northwestern
University Law Professor, John Coons, and two former law students, William Clune and
Stephen Sugarman. In their book, Private Wealth and Public Education, 45 the authors cite
a 1966 government report, "Equality of Educational Opportunity," as the source of the
concept,46 but the history of education finance indicates that reformers worked toward
equalizing educational opportunity at least as far back as the early twentieth century. 47

Education Finance
History
In effect, the United States does not have a history of school finance. Rather, it
has at least fifty individual histories.48

"[l]t is fifty separate stories of controversy,

fumbling, false starts, long periods of inaction, and application of various forms of
informal local and state action. 11 49

Although schools were organized in the United

States in the early colonial period, free public education was "an idea created in the United
States during the nineteenth century."50 There were early education laws in the colonies--

45

Allan R. Odden and Lawrence 0. Picus, School Finance: A Policy Perspective.
(St. Louis, Missouri: McGraw-Hill, 1992), 25.

46
J. Coleman, et. al. U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, 1966. (This
report is also known as the Coleman Report.)

47
Andrew Reschovsky, "Fiscal Equalization and School Finance," National Tax
Journal Vol. 47 No. 1: 185.
48
This work does not examine school finance cases in the District of Columbia
because the District of Columbia is not a state. Like the fifty states, however, the District
of Columbia has problems with its own educational finance system. For a more detailed
description of some of these problems, see Jonathan Kozol's Savage Inequalities.

49
Burrup, Percy E., Vern Brimley Jr. and Rulon R. Garfield, Financing Education in
a Oimate of Change, (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1988), 159.
50
Percy E., Burrup Vern Brimley Jr. and Rulon R. Garfield, Financing Education in
a Climate of Change, (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1988), 8.
·
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for example, the General Court of Massachusetts passed the Old Deluder Satan Act in
1647 (which required every town with fifty or more families to appoint a teacher and towns
with more than one hundred families to establish a secondary school), but education was
overwhelmingly considered a private matter, best left to parents, private teachers, and the
religious.SI
Education in the United States was not always funded by a combination of local,
state, and federal taxes, as it is now and was from 1973 to 1993.
The typical citizen tends to think of the state school systems as having
existed as they are now, from the beginning of the nation, but our patterns
of education, including our financial formulas and schemes, are the
products of more than two centuries of development under a grassroots
process of building--a process that was often erratic.52
Furthermore, local property taxes did not become the primary source of revenue for public
schools until the late nineteenth century.53
Today local, state and federal lawmaking bodies are responsible, albeit to varying
degrees, for funding education.5 4 The level of financial commitment for each of these
bodies has varied. For example, expenditures for elementary and secondary education
comprise the single largest item in local government budgets.55 In contrast, while federal
aid for education is older than the Constitution itself,56 within the past one hundred years,

51

Ibid. at 159.

52

Ibid.

53
Andrew Reschovsky, "Fiscal Equalization and School Finance," National Tax
Journal Vol. 47 No. 1: 185.
54

Percy E. Burrup, Vern Brimley Jr. and Rulon R. Garfield, Financing Education in
a Climate of Change (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1988), 13.

55
Bernal L. Green and Mary Jo Schneider. "Threats to Funding for Rural Schools."
Journal of Education Finance 15 (Winter 1990): 303.

56
Percy E. Burrup, Vern Brimley Jr. and Rulon R. Garfield, Financing Education in
a Climate of Change (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1988), 191.
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the federal commitment to education has never exceeded 10 percent,5 7 i.e. state and local
governments have combined for 90 percent of education's funding.
Despite the importance of this weighty obligation, governmental bodies often use
unscientific and ambiguous procedures to determine the amount of money to be budgeted
for education.58 In part, they do so because in public sector institutions, such as
education, there are no widely accepted methods for determining economic needs. In such
a situation, when objectives may be vague or indeterminate governmental bodies are likely
to look at several factors as substitute guidelines. Influential factors may include: (1) the
organizations objectives and needs; (2) the potential contribution and influence of the
institution; and (3) the political advantage of supporting the organization.59

Education

suffers in such evaluations because it is often unable to demonstrate effectively that
increased financial input produces effective results.
Terminology
Inputs and Outputs
Economically speaking, a greater input should yield a greater output, but with
education, inputs and outputs are somewhat difficult to define and extremely difficult to
measure. Which inputs matter more, dollars or parental influence? What are the outputs
that schools hope to produce? Better workers? Happier individuals? Model citizens?
These questions are based, on the surface, on economic theories, but they cut to the quick
.of ideas centered in educational philosophy. Part of the problem here lies with education

57
Allan R. Odden and Lawrence 0. Picus, School Finance: A Policy Perspective.
(St. Louis, Missouri: McGraw-Hill, 1992), 6.
58
Percy E. Burrup, Vern Brimley Jr. and Rulon R. Garfield, Financing Education in
a Climate of Change (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1988), 13. citing Robert J. Garvue,
Modem Public School Finance (London: Macmillan, 1969), 67.

59
Percy E. Burrup, Vern Brimley Jr. and Rulon R. Garfield, Financing Education in
a Climate of Change (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1988), 13.
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Equality and Equity
Equality means treating everyone the same. In education this might translate as
handing everyone the same $25.00 geography textbook. While such an action may seem
just, it does not consider all of the students in the classroom.

For example, a blind

student's textbook may cost $50.00. A version translated into Spanish may cost $30.00.
Some students may require supplemental materials to learn the same lessons that are
presented in the geography textbook. "Public education systems are designed to produce
equity (fairness) in the treatment of their students, but they do not, cannot, and should not
aspire to produce complete equality. 11 60
Types of Equity. Equity itself has several considerations. First, there are at least
two types of equity--horizontal equity and vertical equity. Horizontal equity "provides that
students who are alike should be treated equally."61 Vertical equity "specifically recognizes
differences among children and addresses the education imperative that some students
deserve or need more services than others. "62

Equity and equality are sometimes used

interchangeably,63 but they are, in fact, distinct terms and are not used interchangeably in
this dissertation.
Equity Considerations.
when? questions.

Equity is also subject to the who? what? where? and

Who is to receive equitable treatment?

Students?

Parents?

Taxpayers? Educators? What is the equity object? When should equitable treatment be
employed? Always? Sometimes? Can criteria be established to set standards for use of

60

Ibid.

61

Allan R. Odden and Lawrence 0. Picus, School Finance: A Policy Perspective.
(St. Louis, Missouri: McGraw-Hill, 1992), 60.

62

Ibid. at 61.

63
Percy E. Burrup, Vern Brimley, Jr., and Rulon R. Garfield, Financing Education
in a Climate of Change, (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1988), 13.
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the equity principle? All of these are important considerations when applying the concept
of equity to any problem involving school finance.
Fiscal Neutrality
The concept of fiscal neutrality means that local school district wealth cannot be
related to per student expenditures. It was developed by Coons, Clune, and Sugarman in
an attempt to provide the court system with some judicially definable standard with which
to compare school finance systems.64 Formally defined, it "is a negative standard, stating
that current operating expenditures per pupil, or some resource, cannot be related to a
school district's adjusted assessed valuation per pupil or some fiscal capacity measure. "65
From 1973 to 1993 states adopted education policies that were "fiscally neutral," at least in
terms of surface language. Today, every state acknowledges fiscal neutrality as the goal of
its financing system.66 As the post-Rodriguez cases will demonstrate, however, few, if
any, states have truly reached fiscal neutrality.
How Rodriguez Came Before the Court
Or Why Is School Finance Being Resolved in a Legal Setting Anyway?
As the previous examination of terminology has already noted, education is not
mentioned in the United States Constitution; it is not a fundamental right. Historically,
local control has dominated community education. How, then, did the issues of school
finance litigation come before any court, much less the United States Supreme Court?
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Allan R. Odden and Lawrence 0. Picus, School Finance: A Policy Perspective.
(St. Louis, Missouri: McGraw-Hill, 1992), 25.
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Ibid. at 332.

66
Andrew Reschovsky, "Fiscal Equalization and School Finance," National Tax
Journal Vol. 47 No. 1: 187.
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The Brown Case & Subsequent Years of Judicial Activism
In Brown v. Board of Education, 67 the United States Supreme Court fully
reviewed the validity of the "separate, but equal" doctrine that it had established in the
1896 Plessy v. Ferguson68 decision. The Plessy decision had held that states could pass
laws that would segregate people according to their race, as long as the laws were
"reasonable, good faith attempts to promote the public good and [were] not designed to
oppress a particular class."69 On May 6, 1954, in a unanimous decision, the Supreme
Court held that "separate" was "inherently unequal" and thus the process of desegregation
began.
The road from Plessy to Brown was not an easy one. More than fifty years were
spent inching toward the elimination of the "separate, but equal" doctrine.

NAACP

attorneys planned a course to wipe out segregation and they followed it step by step. They
reasoned that a direct and immediate challenge to the entire doctrine would probably be
swept aside. Thus, their moves were gradual. They began with challenges to the "equal"
half of "separate, but equal." NAACP attorneys did not argue that "separate, but equal"
was unconstitutional: rather, they urged that segregated facilities were not living up to the
standards set in Plessy, e.g., the facilities were in fact separate, but they were certainly not
equal.70
Familiarity with the Brown case is especially important for understanding the
Rodriguez decision, for several reasons. First, the Brown case demonstrates that the path
toward changing the law is usually slow and arduous.

Laws are not changed through

67

Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed. 873 (1954).
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Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 16 S.Ct. 1138, 41 L.Ed. 256 (1896).

69
John E. Nowak and Ronald D. Rotonda, Constitutional Law, Hornbook Series,
5th ed. (St. Paul, Minnesota: West Publishing Co., 1995), 649.
70
For an in-depth history of the challenge to the "separate, but equal" doctrine, see
Equal Justice, by Richard Kluger.
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spontaneous generation. Instead, lawyers generally develop well-thought-out and wellplanned strategies for meeting their goals. Secondly, Brown is important because it is part
of a period of judicial activism and expansion of human rights under equal protection that
school finance reformers hoped to capitalize upon in Rodriguez. School finance reformers
believed that if the Supreme Court were willing to end segregation of the races, perhaps it
would be willing to bridge the gap between the wealthy and the poor. Reformers reasoned
that if race could qualify as a suspect class, subject to strict judicial scrutiny, perhaps
wealth could qualify as well. Finally, Brown is important to Rodriguez because the facts
of the Brown case developed in schools.
The strategists who dismantled segregation chose education as the field in which to
wage their battle. In the Plessy case, the plaintiff, who alleged that he was seven-eighths
white, attempted to sit in a train section that had been reserved for whites.

NAACP

attorneys could have challenged segregation under other forms of transportation in the
United States.

Perhaps it would have been more logical to do so, but the path to

desegregation was laid in the field of education.
Thus, American schools, in all their non-constitutional glory were brought before
the Supreme Court of the United States, and while some legal cynics might say that schools
were merely the vehicle to bring the issues of segregation and equal protection before the
Court, the Supreme Court itself recognized the importance of education in its decision.
Most educators are familiar with Chief Justice Warren's words:
Today education is perhaps the most important function of state and
rocal governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great
expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the
importance of education to our democratic society. It is required in the
performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service in the
armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a
principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing
him for later professional training, and in helping him adjust normally to his
environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be
expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education.
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Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right
which must be made available to all on equal terms. 71
With language such as this, expounded by the Chief Justice, school finance reformers had
reason to think optimistically. When the man who had argued for the plaintiffs in the
Brown case, Thurgood Marshall, became a member of the Supreme Court, the plaintiffs in
the Rodriguez case had reason to think they could win.

CHAPTER II
THE RODRIGUEZ CASE

Introduction
In 1968, Demetrio Rodriguez, a thirty-two-year-old sheet metal worker, father of
four, and veteran of two wars, joined seven other parents and fifteen students in a lawsuit 1
that would eventually come before the United States Supreme Court as San Antonio v.
Rodriguez. 2 At the time of the initial suit, Rodriguez's children were enrolled in school in
the poor, mostly Hispanic Edgewood Independent School District in San Antonio, Texas.3
His children attended classes at Edgewood Elementary, a building condemned by the city
of San Antonio.4 Rodriguez, who "vowed that his seven-year old son Alex would never
again go to a school that was unsafe, "5 was the first to sign the complaint; thus, his name
appeared first on the lawsuit.6
Rodriguez and the other plaintiffs filed their suit hoping to restructure the school
finance system in Texas, not so that more money would be spent, but so that money would
1
Renee Haines, "Now His Grandchildren Will Suffer Too." UPI, 26 September
1990, Wednesday, BC cycle.
2

San Antonio Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 US. 1, 36 L.Ed 2d 16, 93 S.Ct 1278

3
Renee Haines, "Now His Grandchildren Will Suffer Too." UPI, 26 September
1990, Wednesday, BC cycle.
4
LEXIS transcript, "Texas Struggles to Find Equitable School Finance Plan," All
Things Considered, 27 May 1993, on National Public Radio.
5

Ibid.
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Renee Haines, "Now His Grandchildren Will Suffer Too." UPI, 26 September
1990, Wednesday, BC cycle.
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be spent more equitably. 7 At the time of the suit, education in Texas, like almost every
other state, was funded through a combination of federal, state, and local taxes.8 The
resulting system of school financing was called "chaotic and unjust," 9 even by those who
eventually upheld its constitutionality.
The History of School Financing in Texas
The Early History
Historically, education in Texas was funded through local taxes that were
supplemented through state assistance and, to a small degree, by federal moneys. The state
of Texas provided for a system of free schools in its first constitution when it was admitted
to the Union in 1845. In 1883, the Texas constitution was amended to create local school
districts and to recognize the use of ad valorem 10 property taxes for the building and
maintenance of a free school system. From that time, in the late nineteenth century, until
the late 1940s, local funds were supplemented by two state sources: the State's Permanent
School Fund and the State's Available School Fund.
The State's Permanent School Fund
The State's Permanent School Fund was established in 1854 with money generated
from the sale of lands in Texas. It was established so that there might always be money
for education in Texas. Although the Permanent School Fund still existed at the time the
original Rodriguez suit was filed, it did not play as important a role in the analysis of the
funding situation as did the State's Available School Fund.

7

Ibid.

8

411 US 1, 36 LEd 2d 16, 59.

9

Ibid.
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An ad valorem tax is a tax on the property made according to its value.
Black's Law Dictionary.

See
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The State's Available School Fund
The State's Available School Fund received income from the State Permanent
School Fund as well as ad valorum property taxes and other assessments.I I
Consequently, the amount of money in the State's Available School Fund would vary from
year to year. By the time the Rodriguez case was brought before the Supreme Court, the
Available School Fund was a technical source of support for public schools, but it had been
virtually replaced by the Minimum Foundation Program.12
Increasing Disparities
In spite of these state-supported funds, this system of funding education (through
local taxes with supplementary money provided by the state) produced ever increasing
spending disparities among school districts.

In the twentieth century, as the state became

more industrialized, wealth became more localized. The population of Texas was no
longer spread evenly across the land and property wealth began to cluster in certain areas.
The increased property value of some areas naturally meant that the residents of those areas
were able to make greater provisions for their schools because the schools were funded
locally.
Reform Attempts in the 1940s
By the 1940s, local funding disparities had grown to such proportions and had
such a noticeable effect on the quality of district schools that the state legislature "undertook
a thorough evaluation of public education with an eye toward major reform."13 In 1947,
the state of Texas appointed an eighteen-member committee of legislators and educators to
investigate school finance systems in other states and to devise a plan that would ease

11

San Antonio v. Rodriguez, 411 US 1, 36 L.Ed. 2d 16, 27-28.

12

See Marshall's dissent in San Antonio v. Rodriguez, 411 US 1, 36 L.Ed. 2d 16.

13

San Antonio v. Rodriguez, 411 US 1, 36 L.Ed. 2d 16, 29.
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disparities in local spending in Texas' school districts. By 1949, the eventual result of
their work went into effect as the Texas Minimum Foundation School Program.14
The Minimum Foundation School Program
Money generated by the Minimum Foundation School Program was designated for
three specific costs--namely, teachers' salaries, operating expenses and transportation
costs. Any expenses falling outside of these three categories would have to be funded
from other sources. Revenues for the Program were derived from both the state and local
level. The state provided approximately 80 percent of the Program's funding, while the
local districts, working as a single unit, provided the other 20 percent.15 The 20 percent
provided by the local districts was known as the Local Fund Assignment.16 Each district
contributed local property taxes to the Local Fund Assignment via a complicated formula
that was designed so that a larger share of the costs would be assumed by districts with
high property value. Although all the earlier funding devices remained in effect, by the
time the Rodriguez case reached the Supreme Court in 1973, the Program accounted for
close to half the total educational expenditures in the state.17
School Financing at the Time of Rodriguez
Over the course of the 1970-71 school year, the twelve school districts of Bextar
County, Texas, including Edgewood and Alamo Heights, received funds from the federal,
state, and local levels18 (see Table 1). The federal government contributed approximately
10 percent of the overall public school expenditures, with the rest of the money coming
from state and local sources. As previously noted, state funding came from two programs:

14

Ibid. at 30.

15

Ibid. at 29.

16

Ibid. at 50.

17

Ibid. at 29.

18

Rodriguez v. San Antonio lndep. Sch. Dist., 377 F. Supp. 280.
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(1) The Available School Fund and (2) The Minimum Foundation Program. For the 197071 school year, the Available School Fund totaled $296 million. This money was
distributed to districts on a per capita basis based upon the average daily attendance I 9
during the previous school year. The Minimum Foundation Program, with 80 percent of
its revenue drawn from general state revenues and 20 percent taken from the Local Fund
Assignment, also remained in effect.

19
The term "average daily attendance" appears frequently in school finance formulas
and is not as simple as its name would suggest. Most often, students are "weighted" on
criteria such as grade level or hours in school.
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Table 1-Texas School Financing System at the Time of the Rodriguez Decision

SOURCE

PERCENT
OF TOTAL
FUNDS

DESCRIPTION OF RESOURCES

FEDERAL

10%

Funds were provided for, but not distributed on a
per pupil basis

STATE

50%

Technically,* funds were distributed under two
programs:
Available School Fund
Composed of many sources including the state ad
valorem property tax, 114 total occupation tax,
annual contributions by the legislature from general
revenues, & revenues from the permanent school
fund
Minimum Foundation School Program
80% paid by state
20% paid by local school districts under the Local
Fund Assignment

LOCAL

40%

The amount of money raised depends on the tax
rate and the amount of taxable property

*Although the Texas Constitution, Artide 7, § 5, established the Available school fund, by
1973 the Available School Fund was characterized as "simply one facet" of the Minimum
Foundation School Program because a school district's share of the Available School Fund
is deducted from the amount to which the district is entitled under the Minimum Foundation
Program.
Information used in this table was obtained from the Supreme Court's Rodriguez decision.
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Local fund-raising capabilities remained very important. Money raised locally,
through ad valorem property taxes, went to several sources. It provided for a district's
share of the Minimum Foundation Program; it reduced bonded indebtedness for capital
expenditures; and it financed all expenditures above the state minimum. 20 Although the
ability to tax locally may have been initially seen as a means of "empowering" 21 local
school districts, two factors restricted a local school district's ability to raise funds. The
first factor was the local tax rate, and the second factor was the amount of taxable property
within the district.22
The District Court Case
Synopsis
When the Rodriguez plaintiffs brought their suit to federal court in the Western
District of Texas, they alleged that the ad valorum property tax played a significant role in
determining how much money would be spent on each child's education. The plaintiffs
claimed that under the Texas financing system, students who resided in property poor
districts had far fewer dollars spent on their education than students in wealthier districts,
even though the property-poor districts were taxed at a higher rate. The plaintiffs urged the
court to find that the method of financing education in the state of Texas violated the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution on the
grounds that the state unfairly distinguished the type of education its citizens would receive,
based on the wealth of the district in which they resided.
The defendants did not dispute the distinction between the treatment of various
groups. Instead, they responded that there was a rational relationship between the
financing system and the legitimate state purpose of maintaining local control over schools.

20

Rodriguez v. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 337 F. Supp. 280, 281.

21

Ibid at 281.
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San Antonio v. Rodriguez, 411 US 1, 36 L.Ed. 2d 16, 66.
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According to the defendants, this rational relationship was enough to validate the difference
in treatment.
The court first determined the issue in the case:

Did the system of financing

education in Texas violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?
After considering the facts, the court held that the system of financing education in Texas
violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court mandated the
defendants to "reallocate funds ... so as not to violate the equal protection provisions of both
the United States and Texas constitutions"23 within two years.24
The District Court's Analysis
In its analysis of the facts, the court first acknowledged the three sources of
education funding: federal, state and local. The court noted that federal funds accounted
for "only about ten percent of the overall public school expenditures. "25 Two programs,
the Available School Fund and the Minimum Foundation Program comprised the state
sources. Part of the resources (20 percent) comprising the Minimum Foundation Program
came from the "Local Fund Assignment." In order "to pay their share of the Minimum
Foundation Program, to satisfy bonded indebtedness for capital expenditures, and to
finance all expenditures above the state minimum, "26 local school districts collected ad
valorem taxes.

Districts with lower property value were unable to produce funds at the

same level as districts with a higher property value, even though the poorer districts would
. typically tax at a much higher rate. (For example, Edgewood's production from ad

23
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Before two years had passed, however, the Supreme Court reversed the lower
court's decision.
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Rodriguez v. San Antonio, 337 F. Supp. 280, 281.
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valorem taxes was $21 while Alamo Heights' was $307, even though Alamo Heights taxed
at a lower rate than Edgewood.)27
The court disagreed with defendants' contentions that the rational relationship standard to equal protection should be applied and that a rational relationship existed between
funding distinctions and the legitimate state purpose of maintaining local control. Instead,
the court found that a classification was made on wealth and that education was a fundamental interest. Consequently, "more than mere rationality was required."28 The court
held that, "Because of the grave significance of education to both the individual and to our
society, the defendants must demonstrate a compelling state interest that is promoted by the
current classifications created under the financing scheme. "29 Furthermore, even if
rationality had been an acceptable test, the state was unable to meet the requirements of that
test anyway ,30
The court then distinguished this case from an earlier case, Mcinnis v. Shapiro, 31
"in which the plaintiffs had sought to require educational expenses [based] on 'pupils
educational needs"' ,32 and from other similar cases which had called for excessive federal
involvement in the intricacies of school financing.

Whereas the Mcinnis plaintiffs had

failed to establish adequate definitions for "educational needs," the Rodriguez plaintiffs
called for the implementation of a previously defined term--fiscal neutrality. Furthermore,
while the role of the judiciary was unclear in the establishment of "educational needs,"
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Rodriguez v. San Antonio lndep. Sch. Dist., 337 F. Supp. 280, 283.
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fiscal neutrality simply mandated that the quality of public education may not be a function
of wealth, other than the wealth of the state as a whole.33
The court then brushed aside the defendants' last few arguments.

First, to the

state's contention that the current system was necessary because it granted local decision
making power to individual districts (for the preservation of local control), the court
responded that "the state has in truth and in fact, limited the choice of financing by
guaranteeing that some districts will spend low (with high taxes) while others will spend
high (with low taxes.) Hence, the ... system [did] not serve to promote one of the very
interests which the defendants assert[ed.]" 34 The court also challenged the defendants
claim that the plaintiffs wanted to create socialized education.

The court noted that

education "has been socialized [in the United States] ... almost from its origin. 1135 Finally,
the court stated that "[w ]bile defendants are correct in their suggestion that this Court
cannot act as a 'super-legislature,' the judiciary can always determine that an act of the
legislature is violative of the Constitution. "36 In this instance, the court found that the act
of the legislature that established the school financing system in Texas violated the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.

33

Ibid. at 284.
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35

Ibid.

36

Ibid. at 285.
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The Supreme Court Decision
Synopsis
The case was overturned on appeal to the United States Supreme Court. In a
5-4 decision, the Supreme Court found that the Rodriguez case was not appropriate for
strict judicial scrutiny and that the Texas school system did not violate the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.

Education was

not a fundamental right under the federal Constitution and states could continue to fund
their school systems through the use of ad valorem property taxes.
The Structure of Opinion
The Rodriguez opinion was written by Justice Lewis F. Powell Jr.

Justices

Warren E. Burger, Potter Stewart, Harry A. Blackmun, and William H. Rehnquist joined
in the opinion, i.e. they agreed with both the verdict and the reasoning behind the verdict.
Justice Stewart also wrote a concurring opinion, not to diverge from Justice Powell's
writing, but to emphasize his belief that any other result would have marked "an
extraordinary departure from the principled adjudication under the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. 11 3 7

Justice Byron R. White wrote a dissenting opinion in

which he was joined by Justices William 0. Douglas and William H. Brennan.

Justice

Brennan also voiced his disagreement with the court in an additional dissent on the subject
offundamentality. Finally, Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote a detailed dissent with which
Justice Brennan also concurred.
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Table 2 - ComEosition of the Court at the Time ofthe Rodri~uez Decision

Justice

Born

Appointed by Term Served

Vote

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

1907

Nixon

1972-'ir?

Majority

Warren E. Burger

1907

Nixon

1969-86

Joined

Potter Stewart

1915

Eisenhower

1958-91

Joined & wrote
separate
concurring
opinion

Harry A. Blackmun

1908

Nixon

1970-94

Joined

William H. Rehnquist*

1924

Nixon

1972-Present

Joined

Byron R. White

1917

Kennedy

1962-93

Dissented

William 0. Douglas

1898

F. D. Roosevelt 1939-79

Thurgood Marshall

1908

Johnson

1967-91

Dissented

William H. Brennan, Jr.

1906

Eisenhower

1956-90

Joined in
White's dissent;
concurred with
Marshall's
dissent & wrote
own dissent

Joined in
White's dissent

*Rehnquist became the Chief Justice in 1986.
Sources: The New York Public Library Desk Reference, the Worldbook Encyclopedia and
the Rodriguez decision.

The Majority Opinion
Justice Powell began the majority opinion with an introductory history of the
record. He then divided his opinion into four sections. In the first section, Justice Powell
established the framework for the majority's analysis.38

In the second section, itself

divided into three parts, the majority concluded that "Texas' system of public school
finance [was] an inappropriate candidate for strict judicial scrutiny. "39 In the third section,

38

Ibid. at 33.

35
the majority examined the facts of the case as they were related to the equal protection
clause and found that any disparities were not the "product of a system so irrational as to be
invidiously discriminatory. "40 Finally, in the fourth section, on behalf of the majority,
Powell acknowledged that the system of school finance in Texas needed revision, but that it
was not within the Court's legitimate powers to undertake that task.
In the introductory section of the majority opinion, Justice Powell recognized the
parties and the conditions under which they brought suit. He identified the case as a class
action suit initiated by "Mexican-American parents whose children attended the elementary
and secondary schools in the Edgewood Independent School District"41 brought on behalf
of "children throughout the State who were members of minority groups or who were poor
and lived in school districts with a low property tax base. "42 He then noted that not all of
the children in the complaint attended public school; some attended private school,43 even
though this fact did not affect the certification of the class. Next, Powell named the
defendants: the State Board of Education, the Commissioner of Education, the State
Attorney General, and the Bextar County (San Antonio) Board of Trustees.

Then, the

Justice traced the filing of the complaint, the impaneling of the three-judge district court, the
district court's ruling, and the state's proper appeal.

Finally, Justice Powell indicated the

majority's reversal of the lower court's decision.

J. The first section of the majority opinion began with a brief history of school
financing in Texas. It then moved into a discussion of the "complex" and "complicated"
system under examination,44 highlighting the Minimum Foundation Program. The Court
39

Ibid. at 49.

40

Ibid. at 55.

41

Ibid. at 27.

42

Ibid.
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Ibid. at 26-27.

44

Ibid. at 29.
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reasoned that the Minimum Foundation Program was designed to serve two purposes.
First, it "would have an equalizing influence on expenditure levels between districts by
placing the heaviest burden on the school districts most capable of paying. "45 At the same
time, through the Local Fund Assignment, every school district would be "force[d] ... to
contribute to the education of its children but that would not itself exhaust any district's
resources. "46
Powell then went on to compare the Edgewood and Alamo Heights communities,
including their racial compositions, student enrollments, tax rates and assessed property
values47 (see Table 3). He also noted that from 1949 to 1967 state and local expenditures
toward education rose 500 percent and that during the previous ten years, the total school
budget rose from $750 million to $2. l billion.4 8 Powell acknowledged that local taxes
contributed greatly to the amount of money spent by a school district and that reliance on
such taxes produced "substantial interdistrict disparities. n 49

45

Ibid.

46

Ibid.

47

Ibid. at 30-32.

48

Ibid. at 30.

49

Ibid. at 32.
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Table 3 - Comparison Edgewood and Alamo Heights at the Time of the Rodriguez Decision

Edgewood

Alamo Heights

Total enrollment for
elementary & secondary

22,862 students

5,432

Number of schools

25

6

Amount of commercial
or industrial property

Residential community
Little commerce or industry

Residential Community

Racial background of
residents

90% Mexican-American

82% "Anglo"
18% Mexican-American
Less than 1% AfricanAmerican

Median family income

$4,686
Lowest in metropolitan area

$8,001

Averaged assessed
property value

$5,960 per pupil
Lowest in metropolitan area

$49,078 per pupil

Equalized tax rate per
$100 of assessed
property

$1.05
Highest in metropolitan area

$.85

Local contribution
above and beyond the
local fund assignment
requirement

$26 per pupil

$333 per pupil

State contribution
through the minimum
foundation program

$222 per pupil

$225 per pupil

Total local & state
funds

$248 per pupil

$558 per pupil

Federal funds

$108 per pupil

$36 per pupil

Total funds

$356 per pupil

$594 per pupil

6% African-American
4% unidentified/other

Source: The Supreme Court's decision in Rodriguez.
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Justice Powell then summarized the District Court's findings that: ( 1) "wealth"
was a suspect class; (2) education was a fundamental interest; and (3) that because the
state of Texas could not demonstrate a compelling state interest for maintaining its school
financing system, the system had to be abolished.

Finally, he added: "Texas virtually

conceded that its historically rooted dual system of financing education could not withstand
strict judicial scrutiny. "50

With this factual framework in place, Powell began the

majority's analysis.

!L.

According to the majority, the District Court's opinion did not "reflect the

novelty and complexity of the constitutional questions posed by the appellees' challenge to
Texas' system of school financing. "51 The Supreme Court alleged that District Court in
Rodriguez, as well as courts in other school finance cases,52 had "virtually assumed their
findings of a suspect class through a simplistic process of analysis."53 In the majority's
view, the Supreme Court itself had never examined a case of wealth discrimination similar
to the one presented by the facts of the Rodriguez case. Preliminary questions as to the
nature of the class needed to be addressed before resolving the complex constitutional
questions.
A. The first preliminary question that the Court sought to address was whether the
class of plaintiffs in Rodriguez indeed constituted a suspect class.

If it did constitute a

suspect class, then the court would be compelled to examine the Texas education financing
plan with strict judicial scrutiny. (See Chapter 1 for more on suspect classes and strict
judicial scrutiny.) For several reasons, however, the Court found that the Rodriguez class
was not suspect.

50

Ibid. at 33.
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Ibid. at 34.
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Such as the California Supreme Court case Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal 3d 584, 487
P.2d 1241 (1971).
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First, the Court failed to find a definable class of poor people.
suggested that the class alleging discrimination might be comprised of:

The Court

(1) people whose

income was below a certain determined level; or (2) people who were relatively poorer
than certain others; or (3) people in a certain district who were poorer than others in that
district.5 4 The plaintiffs in this case were "a large, diverse and amorphous class, unified
only by the common factor of residence in districts that happen to have less taxable wealth
than other districts. "55
The Court then compared the alleged deprivation suffered by the Rodriguez
plaintiffs to that which was endured by plaintiffs in other cases where the Court had found
discrimination against a class based on wealth.56

In Rodriguez, the court reasoned that

the plaintiffs were not completely deprived of a state service as they were in other cases.
The court found that the plaintiffs did have the opportunity to an education. The majority
wrote that the State of Texas provided 12 years of free public school, in addition to
teachers, books, transportation funds, and operating expenses. In addition, the majority
pointed out that the plaintiffs never claimed that they were deprived of an education in their
argument . The plaintiffs asserted only that they received "a poorer quality education than
that available to children in districts having more assessable wealth. 11 57
Finally, the Court asserted that even if the class in this case could have been
defined, it possessed none of the usual traits of suspectness that had been defined in earlier
cases.

In

"suspect."

the past, only certain characteristics would render a class

For example, in previous cases, classes were considered suspect if it was
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See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12,100 L.Ed. 891, 76 S.Ct. 585, 55 ALR 2d
1055 (1956) where the Court invalidate laws that prevented an indigent defendant from
obtaining a trial transcript necessary to the appeal process.
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subject to a history of purposeful discrimination, such as racial discrimination. Classes
could also be considered suspect if they were either burdened with extreme disabilities or
so politically powerless that they required the protection of the government's strict scrutiny
analysis under the equal protection clause.58 According to Powell, the Rodriguez plaintiffs
did not demonstrate any of these characteristics. Thus, in the majority's view, there was
no suspect class.
B. The majority was careful not to downplay the importance of education,
however. It cited the Brown case for the proposition that "education is perhaps the most
important function of state and local governments." Furthermore, the majority claimed that
the Court had been dedicated to public education throughout the course of United States
history.59 "But, [the Court argued] the importance of a service performed by the State
does not determine whether it must be regarded as fundamental for the purposes of
examination under the Equal Protection Clause. "60 This was the next subject addressed by
the majority.
In Rodriguez, the plaintiffs had asserted that even if the Court would not recognize
a discernible class of poor people whose rights were to be evaluated with strict scrutiny the
right to education was, nonetheless, fundamental.

In the Court's view, the key to

determining whether the plaintiffs were correct and whether education was fundamental
could not be found by comparing education with other rights. Rather, the Court looked to
the United States Constitution. The Court examined the Constitution to see whether a right
to education was either explicitly or implicitly guaranteed.61 In this case, the majority held
that there was no such constitutional guarantee to education.

58

Ibid. at 40.

59

Ibid. at 41.

60

Ibid. at 41.

61

Ibid. at 43.

41
The Court pointed out that education, because it is not mentioned in the federal
Constitution, could not be considered among the rights explicitly afforded by the
document. The plaintiffs had argued, however, that the right to education was implicitly
guaranteed by the Constitution.
Specifically, they insist[ed] that education is a fundamental personal right
because it is essential to the effective exercise of First Amendment freedoms
and to intelligent utilization of the right to vote. In asserting a nexus
between speech and education, appellees urge that the right to speak is
meaningless unless the speaker is capable of articulating his thoughts
intelligently and persuasively. The 'marketplace of ideas' is an empty
forum for those lacking basic communicative tools. Likewise they argue[ d]
that the corollary right to receive information becomes little more than a
hollow privilege when the recipient had not been taught to read, assimilate
and utilize available knowledge.62
The Court did "not dispute any of these propositions, "63 but it did not find education to be
a fundamental right either.
Powell wrote that the Supreme Court had "never presumed either the ability or
authority to guarantee to the citizenry the most effective speech or the most informed
electoral choice,"64 (emphasis in the original text). Consequently, even if education was a
fundamental right (because of its necessity relative to other rights), Powell questioned how
much and what type of education was necessary. The court also pointed out that adequate
food and shelter might also be necessary to the successful exercise of other rights, but these
rights were not constitutionally fundamental. The Court reasoned that if education was a
fundamental right under the type of argument offered by the plaintiffs that fundamental
right status might have to be extended to other important personal interests. 65
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C. In the final part of the second section of the majority opinion, Justice Powell
suggested that the Supreme Court would not become a so-called "super-legislature. "66
Powell wrote, "We have here nothing less than a direct attack on the way in which Texas
bas chosen to raise and disburse state and local tax revenues."

The majority had several

reasons for failing to enter into the resolution of Texas's school financing problems.
First, the majority reported that to do so "would have the Court intrude in an area in
which it has traditionally deferred to state legislatures. "67 Furthermore, the Court believed
that is was impossible to implement a tax system that was completely free of
discrimination.68 In addition, the Court suggested that there were still too many
unanswered questions as to the relationship between funding and educational quality for it
to make an informed decision about such matters.

According to the majority, even

education policy experts disagreed on whether there was a correlation between educational
expenditures and educational quality. 69 Somewhat fatalisticlaly, the majority opined, "The
ultimate wisdom as to these and related problems of education is not likely to be divined for
all time even by the scholars who now so earnestly debate the issues. "70 Lastly, the Court
suggested that an active role in this case had the potential to interfere with the traditional
state/federal government relationship. "[l]t would be difficult to imagine a case having
greater potential impact on our federal system than the one now before us. 11 71

66
The Court actually discussed the 'super legislature phenomenon earlier in the case
in Section II, Part B. The Court borrowed the phrase form an earlier Supreme Court
decision, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 Us at 665, 661, 22 L Ed 2d 600.
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In sum then, the Court asserted in Section II that in the Rodriguez case, there was
no suspect class, education was not shown to be a fundamental right, and the Supreme
Court would not act as a "super-legislature." Thus, for all these reasons (cited in Parts A,
B, and C) the Supreme Court concluded that "Texas' system of public school finance [was]
an inappropriate candidate for strict judicial scrutiny. "72 The system could still be declared
unconstitutional, however, if the state failed to meet the rational relationship test. The
Court went on to address that possibility in the next section.
III.

In the third section of the majority opinion, Powell addressed whether the

Texas school financing system, "with its conceded imperfections, nevertheless bore some
rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose. "73 Powell again reviewed the structure
of the financing system and admitted:
In part, local differences are attributable to differences in the rates of
taxation or in the degree to which the market value for any category of
property varies from its assessed value.
The greatest interdistrict
disparities, however, are attributable to the differences in the amount of
assessable property available within any district. Those districts that have
more valuable property, have a greater capacity for supplementing state
funds.74
Powell went on to acknowledge that wealthy districts could pay for better teachers and
lower the student -teacher ratio, which would suggest that wealthier districts could provide
a better education.
In spite of these admissions and their implications, the majority nonetheless found
that the state's school financing system bore a rational relationship to a legitimate state
purpose.

Powell listed at least eight reasons for the majority's position:
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1.

The use of this type of funding system was widespread throughout the
United States. Almost every other state used a similar formula for funding
state schools.

2.

Texas had a long history of using the local property tax to finance
education.

3.

The Texas system of school financing was responsive to both state and local
interests, in accordance with the renowned educational finance theories of
George D. Strayer and Robert M. Haig.

4.

Parents and taxpayers could exercise local control in that they could devote
more of their own money to their own children and that they could also
determine how their own tax dollars would be spent.

5.

The existence of "some inequality" was not enough to strike down the
whole system. Neither was the fact that, hypothetically, a better system of
school financing might be possible.

6.

Even poor districts were not completely devoid of educational choices. For
example, they could determine how available funds would be allocated and
could also make "numerous decisions" as to the operation of their school.

7.

Giving the state a greater financial responsibility would be likely to
diminish local power.

8.

Any system of local taxation was likely to establish boundaries and
property value fluctuation and/or disparities may result, but that did not
make such methods oflocal taxation unconstitutional.

Thus, the majority concluded that the District Court had erred when it found that "the State
had failed even 'to establish a reasonable basis' for a system that results in different
spending levels of pupil expenditures. 11 7 5
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Section IV.

In the final section of the majority opinion, Powell reiterated the

importance of education, but again pointed out the complexity of educational finance issues
and the disagreement among educational researchers as to the best way to improve
conditions in the poorest districts. The majority called for "innovative thinking as to public
education, its methods, and its funding," but saw fit to exercise judicial restraint. It did not
want to violate "the values of federalism and separation of powers"76 by becoming
involved in matters it considered better left to the legislature. Educational finance issues did
indeed require the continued attention of scholars, but, according to the Court, the
"ultimate solutions" to these problems had to come from the legislature.
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Justice Stewart's Concurring Opinion
In his concurring opinion, Justice Stewart wrote that just because a system (such as
the education financing system in Texas or any other state) is "chaotic and unjust," it does
not mean that system is unconstitutional. Furthermore, according to Stewart, the equal
protection clause does not exist in order to grant "substantive rights" or "substantive
liberties"7 7; it exists simply to measure government classifications. Stewart wrote that "it
has long been settled that the Equal Protection Clause is offended only by laws that are
invidiously discriminatory--only by classifications that are wholly arbitrary or capricious. 78
Despite the inequities in the system, Stewart did not believe that the school finance laws
were invidiously discriminatory or that they formed arbitrary or capricious classifications.
Stewart then voiced his further agreement with the majority's conclusion.

He

found that there was no violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment because (1) there was no identifiable class that had been discriminated against
under equal protection; (2) even if such a class had existed, they would have had none of
the traditionally accepted criteria to make that class suspect; (3) the Texas school financing
system did not "rest on grounds wholly irrelevant to the state's objectives";79 and the Texas
system did not impinge upon any substantive constitutional rights or liberties.

Thus,

Stewart agreed with the majority's holding.
Brennan's Dissent
Justice Brennan made a special point of disagreeing with the majority's analysis as
to just what constitutes a fundamental right.80

Unlike the majority, which wrote that a
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Black's Law Dictionary defines a substantive right as "{a] right to the equal
enjoyment of fundamental rights, privileges and immunities; distinguished from procedural
rights." (p.1281).
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right was fundamental for purposes of equal protection analysis only if it was "explicitly or
implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution, "81 Brennan asserted that fundamentality was "in
large measure, a function of the right's importance in terms of the effectuation of those
rights which are in fact constitutionally guaranteed. 11 82 In Brennan's view, the closer the
relationship between the government activity (here the provision of schools) and the
constitutional interest, the stricter the scrutiny.

In this case, according to Brennan, there

was "no doubt that education is inextricably linked to the right to participate in the electoral
process and to the rights of free speech and association guaranteed by the First
Amendment." 83

By following this reasoning, the only correct conclusion according to

Brennan, was that the Texas school financing system was invalid.
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Justice White's Dissent (Joined by Justices Douglas and Brennan)
In his dissent, Justice White disagreed with the majority's conclusion that the
Texas school financing system provided "a rational and sensible method of achieving the
state aim of preserving an area for local initiative and decision [through the use of local
property taxes.]"84 In White's view, there was no meaningful local option for poor
districts.
The difficulty with the Texas system is that it provides a meaningful option
to Alamo Heights and like school districts but that almost none to
Edgewood and those other districts with a low per-pupil real estate tax base.
In these latter districts no matter how desirous parents are of supporting
their schools with greater revenues, it is impossible to do so through the use
of the real estate property tax. In these districts, the Texas system utterly
fails to extend a realistic choice to parents because the property tax, which is
the only revenue raising mechanism extended to school districts, is
practically and legally unavailable. 85
Poorer districts were trapped by their low property values and high tax rates.
Like the majority, White also looked to the factual statistics surrounding the
Rodriguez case.8 6 He used a few additional statistics, however, to emphasize his view
that the financial disparities among Texas school districts were "undeniably serious. "87
He pointed out that in order for both Alamo Heights and Edgewood to reach the highest
local property tax yield in Bextar County, Alamo Heights could tax at 68¢ per $100 of
assessed valuation, but Edgewood would have to tax at $5.76 per $100 of assessed value,
just to reach the same goal.

"But state law place[d] a $1.50 per $100 ceiling on the

. maintenance tax rate, a limit that would surely [have been] reached long before Edgewood
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attained an equal yield. "88 Edgewood was, therefore, "precluded in law as well as in fact,
from achieving a yield even close to that of some other districts. 11 89
White then examined the facts in light of the rational relationship test under the
equal protection clause. He agreed with the majority's contention that the State of Texas
had a legitimate interest in preserving the concept of local control, but he found that the
present system classified individuals in such a way as to make local control impossible for
people living in certain districts.90

If the State aim[ed] at maximizing local initiative and local choice by
permitting school districts to resort to the real property tax if they choose to
do so, it utterly fail[ed] in achieving its purpose in districts with property tax
bases so low that there is little if any opportunity for interested parents, rich
or poor, to augment school district revenues.91
In White's view, the parents and children in property-poor districts such as
Edgewood suffered from invidious discrimination.92
White was careful to mention that the elimination of Texas's discriminatory system
did not have to bring the type of dramatic changes that some might fear. It would not have
to mean the end of local control. Furthermore, it would not have to mean that the State of
Texas would have to dole out the exact same dollar sum to every individual student in the
state.

Nor would it have to mean that states would be hampered by inflexible

constitutional restraints because of their obligation to educate. "On the contrary it would
merely mean that the State must fashion a financing scheme which provides a rational basis
for the maximization of local control, if local control is to remain a goal of the system. "93
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Before concluding his dissent, White made a few additional points. First, he reemphasized his belief that the differences between wealthy and poor districts were not
inconsequential. According to White, even the State of Texas recognized the importance
of providing educational opportunities above and beyond a bare minimum.

Finally,

unlike the majority, Justice White had no difficulty identifying a class that was treated
differently under a state-sponsored system. He indicated that he needed to look "no farther
than the parents and children in the Edgewood district. "94
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Marshall's Dissent (with Which Douglas Concurred)
Marshall constructed his dissent carefully, just as Powell had constructed the
majority. Obviously, however, Marshall reached the opposite conclusion. In his lengthy
dissent, Marshall attempted to take apart the majority's reasoning, but Marshall's dissent
was by no means purely academic. His logical arguments apparently reflected his own
beliefs.
Marshall introduced the first section of his dissent by redefining the issue in the
case.

According to Marshall, the issue was not whether Texas was "doing its best to

ameliorate the worst features of a discriminatory schemej but, rather, whether the scheme
itself [was] in fact constitutionally discriminatory in the face of the Fourteenth
Amendment's guarantee of equal protection of the laws. 11 95
I. A. Marshall then restated the basic structure of the Texas school financing

system, with its federal, state and local contributions. He emphasized the fact that the
poorest districts had the highest tax rates, but the lowest property values. 96 Therefore, he
concluded, even with proportionately higher taxes, it would be virtually impossible for
poorer districts ever to achieve the funding potential of wealthier districts.
According to Marshall, the state programs, supposedly designed to ease the
financial disparities, had no such effect.

Marshall pointed to flaws in the Local Fund

Assignment portion of the Minimum Foundation School Program.

In Texas, an

"Economic Index" had established the contribution of individual districts to the Local Fund
Assignment.

Poorer districts were supposed to pay according to ability, but Marshall

claimed that in reality, that was not always the case.

He quoted one of the original

consultants working on the Minimum Foundation School Program, Dr. Edgar Morphet, as
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stating that "The Economic Index approach to evaluating local ability offers a little better
measure than sheer chance, but not much. "97
Furthermore, Marshall declared that even the majority's much touted increased state
spending did not alleviate the disparities.
The majority continually emphasizes how much state aid has, in recent years
been given to property poor Texas school districts. What the Court fails to
emphasize is the cruel irony of how much more state aid is being given to
property-rich districts on top of their already substantial local property tax
revenues. 9 8
In fact, the gap between the rich districts and the poor districts was not shrinking, but
growing. For example, from the 1967-68 school year to the 1970-71 school year the gap
between rich and poor districts had grown by 38 percent. In terms of dollars, whereas in
1967-68 the Minimum Foundation Program supplied $222 for each Edgewood student,
and $225 for each Alamo Heights student, by the 1970-71 school year, Edgewood
received $356 per student and Alamo Heights $491 per student.
escalated from a mere $3 to $135.

The difference had

Thus, Marshall agreed with the District Court's

observation that "the system tend[ed] to subsidize the rich at the expense of the poor, rather
than the other way around. 1199
B. In the second part of his first section of analysis, Marshall began by voicing his
disbelief with the state's contention that the quality of education in any particular district
was not determined by money.

"In my view ... even an unadorned restatement of this

contention is sufficient to reveal its absurdity."100
educational inputs were provided by money.101

Marshall stressed that significant
(See Chapter 1 for a discussion of
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educational inputs.) Marshall believed that, in the Rodriguez case, the facts demonstrated
that the lack of funds reduced the educational inputs for children in poorer districts.102
Reduced inputs meant less qualified teachers, more crowded classrooms, and poorer
facilities, 103 not to mention outdated materials, unsanitary conditions, and less hope for the
future.
Furthermore, Marshall pointed out that if money was not important to the quality of
a child's education, surely wealthy districts from outside Texas would not spend their time
and money hiring attorneys to write amicus curirel04 briefs in support of the state's
position, as they had done in the Rodriguez case. I 05 Marshall thus implied that wealthy
parents, as well as poor parents, knew the importance of money to a school district.
Within the course of this discussion on the relationship between money and
educational quality, Marshall took the opportunity to address the Court's role in the case.
Like the majority, Marshall acknowledged that it was not the role of the court to resolve
educational finance disparities. The role of the court was simply to enforce the United
States Constitution.10 6 Unlike the majority, however, Marshall believed that the facts of
the case did raise the "grave" constitutional question as to whether the state's school

101
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financing scheme constituted a form of state-created discrimination in the public provision
of education.10 7
Marshall admitted that the Constitution did not require precisely equal treatment of
all people at all times, but neither did the Constitution allow discrimination under the guise
of adequacy. The state could not establish a system where everyone received a bare
minimum described as "adequate," but where some were virtually guaranteed to receive far
more than "adequate." Marshall wrote, "this Court has never suggested that because some
'adequate' level of benefits is provided to all, discrimination in the provision of services is
therefore constitutionally excusable." l 08
Marshall also questioned how, after the majority had so strongly expressed its
reluctance to become involved in the determination of educational standards, the Court
could accept the appellants' judgment as to the "adequacy" of education in Texas.
One would think that the majority would heed its own feverent affirmation
of judicial self-restraint before undertaking the complex task of determining
at large what level of education is constitutionally sufficient. Indeed, the
majority's apparent reliance upon the adequacy of the educational
opportunity assured by the Texas Minimum Foundation School Program
seems fundamentally inconsistent with its own recognition that educational
authorities are unable to agree upon what makes for educational quality.109
Thus, Marshall implied that the majority was certain that even though educators did not
know the elements of a good education, they did, nonetheless know the components of an
adequate education.
Even if adequacy had been an acceptable standard, the Minimum Foundation
Program failed to provide for adequate education anyway.
system in Texas was far beyond inadequate.

In fact, the school finance

The Texas system provided unequal

educational opportunity and it was this unequal educational opportunity that raised the
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question of the denial of equal protection of the laws.11 o Consequently, Marshall had no
trouble finding "a sufficient showing to raise a substantial question of discriminatory action
in violation of the equal protection clause." 111
C. Marshall then examined whether there was a legitimate class experiencing
discrimination. Not surprisingly, Marshall found such a class.

In Marshall's view, the

facts alone, as they were determined by the District Court, were enough to prove the
existence of a class.

The facts of the Rodriguez case provided a legitimate class of

individual interests experiencing discrimination, not just a scheme where some districts
received more than others.
Texas has chosen to provide free public education for all its citizens, and it
has embodied that decision in its constitution. Yet, having established
public education for its citizens, the State, as a direct consequence of the
variations in local property wealth endemic to Texas' financing scheme, has
provided some Texas schoolchildren with substantially less resources for
their education than others. Thus, while on its face the Texas scheme may
merely discriminate between local districts, the impact of that discrimination
falls directly upon the children whose educational opportunity is dependent
upon where they happen to live.112
The class was comprised of children whose educational opportunity was dependent upon
where they happened to live.113
Justice Marshall also disagreed with Justice Stewart's contention that an objectively
identifiable class was necessary before the court could evaluate a claim under the equal
protection clause. In Marshall's view, it was not the class that determined whether to
. invoke equal protection analysis; it was the nature of the discrimination. In the Rodriguez
case, there was an "overarching form of discrimination"l 14 because the state of Texas
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discriminated between schoolchildren on "the basis of taxable property within their
district." l l 5
II. A. In his second section, Marshall moved into his equal protection analysis.
He prefaced his analysis by summarizing the ways in which the District Court and the
majority had used the clause in their respective opinions.

According to Marshall, the

District Court had held that under the facts of the Rodriguez case, the state had to show, not
merely a rational relationship, but a compelling state interest for their school financing
scheme. The District Court had found that the state's system was subject to the stricter
scrutiny because the District Court had viewed the classification of citizens, based on
wealth, as highly suspect and because the classification itself affected a fundamental
interest--education. On the other hand, Marshall noted, the majority had concluded that
under the Rodriguez facts, it was necessary only to employ a standard of rationality.
Marshall disagreed with the majority's contention. Justice Marshall believed that the
majority had reached its decision to implement the rational relationship test through a
"rigidified" and "labored" equal protection analysis.
Marshall did not believe, as did the majority, that "the 'answer' to whether an
interest [was] fundamental for purposes of equal protection [was] always determined by
whether that interest 'is a right. .. explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the
Constitution."'116 Marshall wrote:
I would like to know where the Constitution guarantees the right to
procreatel 11... or the right to vote in state electionslls... or the right to an
appeal to a criminal conviction 119...These are instances in which, due to the
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importance of the interests at stake, the Court has displayed a strong
concern with the existence of discriminatory state treatment. But the Court
never said or indicated that these are interests which independently enjoy
full blown constitutional protection.120
The interests of procreation, voting and appealing criminal convictions were not explicitly
or implicitly part of the Constitution, but the Court had nonetheless evaluated them with
strict scrutiny when they were closely related to a constitutionally guaranteed right. 121
In order to ensure the integrity of the constitutional guarantee, Marshall argued that
related interests also had to be protected.
The task in every case should be to determine the extent to which
constitutionally guaranteed rights are dependent on the interests not
mentioned in the Constitution. As the nexus between the specific
constitutional guarantee and the nonconstitutional interest draws closer, the
non constitutional interest becomes more fundamental and the degree of
judicial scrutiny applied when the interest is infringed on a discriminatory
basis must be adjusted accordingly.122
While the interests themselves might not be fundamental, they might require strict judicial
scrutiny.
Marshall then highlighted other Supreme Court cases where unprotected interests so
seriously affected constitutional rights that any state laws, established to restrict the
unprotected interests, had been struck down. Lastly, Marshall differentiated between the
facts of the Rodriguez case and other cases where a state's economically based interests
were challenged.

Marshall admitted that "in the context of economic

interests ... discriminatory state action is almost always sustained."123

When the

discrimination affects the important individual interests of a disadvantaged class and the
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interests are simultaneously related to constitutional guarantees, however, the Court should
employ a strict scrutiny standard.
B.

In Part B of Section II, Marshall recognized the fundamentality of

education.124 He gave three reasons for this recognition: (1) the United States Supreme
Court had an historic commitment to education;
"unique status"l25 in American society; and

(2) public education was accorded a

(3) education was very closely related to

"some of our most basic constitutional values.126
As for the Court's strong interest in education, Marshall called it "a matter of
commonknowledge."127

He cited the Court's opinion in the Brown case to emphasize

the Court's historic commitment. In fact, he used the some of the exact same quotations
that the majority had used to emphasize how important education was in the eyes of the
Supreme Court.128
Then Marshall proceeded to examine the importance of education in American
society.

He pointed out that almost every state acknowledged education in its state

constitution and likewise almost every state had compulsory attendance laws.129

In

Marshall's view, "No other state function is so uniformly recognized as an essential
element of our society's well-being." 130
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Finally, Marshall addressed the importance of education to the rights of free speech
and political participation. "Education directly affects the ability of a child to exercise his
First Amendment interests, both as a source and a receiver of information and ideas,
whatever interests he may pursue in life ... [the United States Supreme Court has] not
casually described the classroom as the 'marketplace of ideas."' 131 Furthermore, Marshall
added, without adequate education, participation in the political process would be severely
hampered.

To emphasize this point, Marshall cited statistics drawn from the 1968

presidential election that demonstrated the correlation between individual education and the
likelihood of voting.
Then Marshall again challenged the majority's interpretation of the key issue in the
case. Marshall believed that "the issue was one of discrimination that affect[ ed] the quality
of education which Texas had chosen to provide its children."132 The Rodriguez plaintiffs
had not asked for the best education, as the majority appeared to imply. They sought only
to end the state discrimination that was based upon the unequal distribution of taxable
district property wealth and that resulted in unequal educational opportunity.133
Marshall summarized his views on the fundamentality of education in the following
manner:
The factors just considered, including the relationship between education
and the social and political interests enshrined within the Constitution,
compel us to recognize the fundamentality of education and to scrutinize
with appropriate care the bases for state discrimination affecting equality of
educational opportunity in Texas ' school districts--a conclusion which is
only strengthened when we consider the character of the classification in
this case.134
Marshall then went on to consider the plaintiffs' classification.
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C. In Part C of Section II of Justice Marshall's dissent, Marshall disagreed with

the majority's portrayal of a disadvantaged class.

The majority had asserted that, in

previous cases, the disadvantaged class has "shared two distinguishing characteristics: (1)
"because of their impecunity they were completely unable to pay for some desired benefit."
and 2) "as a consequence, they sustained an absolute deprivation of a meaningful
opportunity to enjoy that benefit."135 Marshall found otherwise.
He cited three cases to illustrate his point, Harper v. Virginia Board of Education 13 6
and Griffin v. Illinoisl37 and Douglas v. Califomia.138 In Harper, the Court struck down
an entire poll tax, rather than simply exempting those to poor to pay.

In the Court's view

the tax had been unfair both to those who could not pay and to those who would choose
not to pay.

In Marshall's view, this ruling demonstrated that a total inability to pay was

not a necessary characteristic of a disadvantaged class. Likewise, according to Marshall,
Griffin and Douglas confirmed that the class need not be comprised of those who are
absolutely deprived of an opportunity to enjoy a benefit. In the Griffin and Douglas cases,
the plaintiffs were, respectively to poor to pay for a transcript and counsel to use in the
appeal process. Marshall wrote: "The right of appeal was not absolutely denied to those
too poor to pay; but because of the cost of a transcript and of counsel, the appeal was
substantially less meaningful for the poor than for the rich."139
Marshall recognized that the Rodriguez case was not identical to the earlier cases of
Harper, Griffin, and Douglas.

Those cases dealt with individual wealth rather than the

wealth of a group, such as a school district.

Marshall indicated that the Court had not
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Ibid. at 35.
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351 U.S. 12,100 L.Ed. 891, 76 S.Ct. 585, 55 ALR 2d 1055 (1956).

138

372 US 353, 9 L.Ed. 2d 739, 89 S.Ct. 1404 (1969).
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traditionally viewed the poor, as a group, in the same way it viewed individual poverty.
Whereas cases of individual impecunity might cause government classifications to be
examined with strict scrutiny, group poverty classifications were traditionally examined
under a rational relationship standard.
Furthermore, in Marshall's view, the poor were not "as politically powerless"l 40 as
certain racial and ethnic groups.

In the past, discrimination against racial and ethnic

groups had rendered them virtually politically powerless; thus, restrictions against these
groups were subject to strict judicial scrutiny. The situation with the poor was somewhat
different , in Marshall's view. Marshall wrote: "While the 'poor' have been frequently
been a legally disadvantaged group, it cannot be ignored that social legislation must
frequently take cognizance of the economic status of our citizens."141 Thus, while the poor
might have been historically subject to a stigma similar to those attached to racial and ethnic
groups, the poor were not rendered politically powerless by that stigma because social
legislation had long recognized the special needs of the poor.142
Marshall believed that the level of scrutiny at which to evaluate wealth
classifications should be determined by the importance of the interests being affected and
the relevance of personal wealth to those interests.143 In the Rodriguez case, he found that
the discrimination, even though it was technically group discrimination should be subject to
strict scrutiny.

In this case, individual children had no control over the formation of

districts or their possible inclusion in a property-poor district. In the Rodriguez case, the
"discrimination is no reflection of the individual's characteristics or his abilities. And thus
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--particularly in the context of a disadvantaged class composed of children--we have
previously treated discrimination on a basis which the individual cannot control as
disfavored." 144
Justice Marshall then added two more points in favor of his disadvantaged class
theory. He found that the Rodriguez plaintiffs were politically disadvantaged because in
order to change the school financing system, they would have to challenge wealthy districts
that had "a strong vested interest in the preservation of the status quo."145 Marshall also
indicated that the state of Texas has created this class of plaintiffs when it formed the
financing system and drew the district boundaries. In Marshall's opinion, the Rodriguez
case was unusual because not only did the state permit the discrimination; it also created it.
Marshall wrote:
In the final analysis, then, the invidious characteristics of the group wealth
classification present in this case merely serve to emphasize the need for
careful judicial scrutiny of the State's justifications for the resulting interdistrict discrimination in the educational opportunity afforded the
schoolchildren of Texas.146
Then Marshall moved into the last part of his analysis in Section II.
D.

In Part D, Marshall completed his equal protection analysis.

He had

already found education to be a fundamental interest, the class to be suspect, and the use of
the strict scrutiny test to be appropriate. All that remained for him to do was to examine
the rationale behind the state's discrimination.

According to Marshall, the only

. justification for the preservation of the school financing system offered by the appellants
was that of local control. Although Marshall supported local control, he found that "the
State's purported concern with local control [was] offered primarily as an excuse rather

144

Ibid.

145

Ibid.

146

Ibid. at 96.

63

than as a justification for interdistrict inequality," 147 (emphasis added).

In Marshall's

view, local control was "a myth for many of the local school districts in Texas."1 48
Not surprisingly, the State of Texas failed to meet the strict scrutiny standard.1 49
In fact, Marshall believed, as did the District Court, that the Texas school financing system
was not even rationally related to the legitimate state interest of local control.150
Furthermore, Justice Marshall refused to evaluate any of the alternative financing plans that
were offered by the appellants. Finally, Marshall scolded that if the State of Texas were
ever to appear before the Court with an alternative school financing plan, the State had
better "present something more than the mere sham 11 151 that was before the Court in the
Rodriguez case.
Ill.

Marshall's third and final section was brief.

In this section, Marshall

attempted to quash some of the fears that would have been associated with an affirmation of
the District Court's decision. An affirmation of the District Court's decision would not
have been a "death kne11"152 for local control. According to Marshall, "Clearly this suit
ha[ d] nothing to do with local decision making with respect to educational policy or even
educational spending." 153

Districts would "not necessarily" 154 have to eliminate local

control of educational funding or the local property tax.155 An affirmation of the District
147

Ibid. at 97.

148

Ibid. at 99.

149

Ibid.

150

Ibid. at 97.

151

Ibid. at 99.

152

Ibid.

153

Ibid.

154

Ibid. at 100.

155

Ibid. at 101.

64
Court's decision would only "restrict the power of the State to make educational funding
dependent exclusively upon local property taxation as long as there exist[ed] interdistrict
disparities in taxable property wealth." 156
In his final few sentences, Justice Marshall took the opportunity to admonish the
Court for shirking its responsibility in the Rodriguez case.

The possibility that the

legislature might be able to resolve these school finance problems did not constitute an
adequate reason for the judicial restraint.
The possibility of legislative action is, in all events, no answer to the
Court's duty under the Constitution to eliminate unjustified state
discrimination. In this case, we have been presented with an instance of
such discrimination, in a particularly invidious form, against an individual
interest of large constitutional and practical importance.157
Thus, in Marshall's view, the District Court's opinion should have been affirmed.158

Conclusion
Rodriguez was a lengthy decision.

The majority, concurring, and dissenting

opinions totaled 136 pages. In spite of the length of the opinion, there was much the
opinion did not say and much that was implied. In addition, many unanswered questions
remained. Education finance reformers were unsure what their next steps would be.
Some feared that the movement to bring equal educational opportunity to all students had
ended, at least as far as the courts were concerned.

Others hoped reform might be

available in state courts. If reform was to take place in the state courts, however, the
unresolved issues and problems of Rodriguez would have to be examined. Why did the
Justices vote as they did?

156
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Had the plaintiffs made mistakes?

Would fears about the
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expansion of fundamental rights forever prohibit equal educational opportunity? The next
chapter addresses some of those unanswered questions and considerations.

CHAPTER III
WHATTHEDECISIONDIDNOT SAY

The Justices
Their Duty and Their Life Experiences
At the Supreme Court level, the Justices are rarely called upon to be finders of
fact.I The Supreme Court's duty, in most cases, is simply to review the decision of the
lower court.2 A trial court determines what constitutes "the facts" of the case and then
applies the appropriate law to those facts.

If the case is appealed, the appellate court

simply reviews the application of the law to the facts of the case; it does not create or find
"new" facts. In the Rodriguez case, the District Court took the role as the finder of fact.
The case was then appealed directly to the Supreme Court.3 There the Court reviewed the
application of the law to the facts.
Just as the Supreme Court should not bring new facts to the evaluation of the case,
neither should it let other forces influence its decision. For example, the Court should not

1
They are called upon to be fact finders in a few types of cases (which are not
relevant to the discussion of this case) specifically named in the United States Constitution.
2
The Supreme Court does not have to hear all of the cases. Most cases come before
the Court on a Petition of Certiorari, which the Supreme Court uses as a discretionary
device to choose the cases it wishes to hear. Black's Law Dictionary, p. 207.

3
In some sense, the case was not typical procedurally because the case was first
heard by a three-judge panel of district court judges, which made direct appeal to the United
States Supreme Court possible. Most often, the appeal process involves more steps. The
point here is not to explain in detail the procedural steps to the Supreme Court, but merely
to indicate that the Supreme Court does not typically "find facts" and did not do so in the
Rodriguez case.
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bow to political pressures, nor should it be influenced by the President's thinking. 4

The

Court's integrity is essential to its important role in the system of checks and balances.
Yet, the Justices cannot make their decision in a vacuum. Like any person, even a
person of great rectitude is subject to outside influence. Furthermore, unlike other cases,
the Rodriguez case dealt with an issue that all of the Justices had experienced personally--American education. Although all of the Justices on the Court during the Rodriguez case
were well educated, their educational experiences varied, and while their personal
experiences should not have affected the outcome of the case, the "evidence" suggests that
it might have.
Justice Powell, the author of the majority, came "from an aristocratic family
prominent in Virginia affairs for two centuries. "5 At the time of the decision, he was a
millionaire, living in a mansion on the banks of the James River. 6 When he retired from
the Supreme Court, some fourteen years later, in 1987, he retired as the Court's richest
member.7 Justice Potter Stewart was the son of a "powerful"8 Ohio politician and state
courtjudge. Stewart attended prep school and Yale University. William H. Rehnquist
has been described as "solidly middle-class, 11 9 and while Warren E. Burger and Harry A.
Blackmun worked their way through college and law school, neither, was ever

4
This might not be as easy as it seems, especially if the current president had a
strong opinion on a case and had also nominated some of the current Justices.

5
19.

Linda Mathews, "Rodriguez and Friends," Race Relations Reporter ( July 1973 ):

6
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7
Glen Elsasser and Janet Cawley, "Powell Quits Supreme Court: Jurist, 79, Cast
Pivotal Vote in Key Decisions," Chicago Tribune 1987, p.1, Zone C, LEXIS.
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penniless. Io Thus, the backgrounds of members of the majority suggest that they had
limited personal experience with poverty or with the kind of educational experience poverty
might bring.
The dissenting members of the court came from somewhat different backgrounds.
Thurgood Marshall was "the grandson of a slave and the son of a Baltimore country club
steward."l l He attended segregated schools during the time when schools for blacks and
whites were certainly "separate," but not always "equal." William 0. Douglas, "orphaned
as a boy, was so poor that he spent the summer before he entered Columbia Law School
working his way across the country from Washington state to New York, doing odd jobs
[because] there was no money at home for train fare." 12 Byron R. White grew up as the
son of a small-town lumber dealer, near a rural Colorado area that was no stranger to
poverty. Finally, although William J. Brennan's father eventually became a city
commissioner, "he started out as a labor organizer and was at least once beaten by
police." 13
Certainly, Justices are not supposed to permit their own personal experiences to
sway their case analysis. For example, a Justice should not think, "I walked ten miles in
the snow without shoes to get to school and if it was good enough for me, it's good
enough for anyone." To permit such a bias to influence the facts of a case would be
unacceptable. The Supreme Court's duty is simply to review the decision of the lower
court, without bringing in outside considerations.
In the Rodriguez case, whether the Justices' life experiences affected their
perception of the severity of the educational issues is impossible to say. Possible
correlations between life experience and the Justices' vote may be coincidental; according
10

Ibid.

11

Ibid.

12

Ibid. at 19-20.

13

Ibid. at 19.
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to the highest judicial standards, they should be. Regardless of the nature of such possible
correlations in the Rodriguez case, these differences in judicial backgrounds are interesting
to note.

70
Their Thoughts on the Opposing Views in Rodriguez
Also interesting to note are the Justices' individual perceptions of their colleagues'
opinions in the Rodriguez case. Clearly, strong beliefs were held on both sides. On the
one hand, in his opinion concurring with the majority, Justice Stewart labeled Marshall's
dissent as "imaginative."14 While this adjective might have positive connotations in some
fields (possibly including the education profession), in the Rodriguez case, Stewart's use
of the term was certainly dismissive.

Likewise, in his dissent, Marshall expressed his

strong opposition to the majority's ruling. For example, in his closing remarks, Marshall
wrote:

"The Court's suggestions of legislative redress and experimentation will

doubtlessly be of great comfort to the schoolchildren of Texas' disadvantaged
districts ... "15 Even a cursory reading of Marshall's opinion suggests a sarcastic tone in
the Justice's voice.

The Difficult Nature of the Case
The Close Vote
In the end, the vote in the Rodriguez case was very close, 5 to 4. Yet, even the
numerical translation of the Justices' positions on the case does not demonstrate how close
the case came to being decided in the plaintiffs' favor. John Coons, "widely considered to
have been the principal intellectual force behind the legal theories that the Court tested in
Rodriguez," learned from a law clerk,16 who worked at the Supreme Court during the
Rodriguez case, that "the plaintiffs had a majority on their side right until the end." 17

The

school finance reformers involved in the case eventually learned which Justice changed his

14

San Antonio v. Rodriguez, 411 US. 1, 36 L.Ed. 2d 16 at 58.

15

Ibid. at 101.

16

Coons did not identify the law clerk by name.

"A Decade After Rodriguez: An Interview with John Coons," Phi Delta Kappan,
(March 1983): 479.
17
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mind, although they were quiet about the identity of the Justice. Coons stated, "There is
no point in my identifying the swing man, but the decision was a close shave."18
The Potential Concerns of the Majority
The fact that one of the Justices may have changed his mind suggests the difficult
nature of the case. The disparities in funding and educational opportunities were obvious
both to the dissenters and to the majority.

The difficulty with the Rodriguez case,

however, lay not so much with the facts but with the application of the facts to the United
States Constitution. Coons expressed his belief that "in general, it must have been hard
for the Justices to be certain that they were not lighting the fuse to a powder keg instead of
straightening out an incoherent system."19 These powder keg issues included the
expansion of fundamental rights, the role of excessive judicial activism, and an unknown
future of constitutional dilemmas.
For example, the expansion of fundamental rights was probably a legitimate
concern for the majority.

As Powell noted, if education was pronounced a fundamental

right, what about the "rights" to food and shelter? Are not the needs for food and shelter
more elementary than that of formal education? The addition of one fundamental right
could have led to others. For example, what about the potential "right" to be free from
violence?

Would it also be the state's responsibility to keep children in state supported

housing projects reasonably safe and protected from violence? If so, are the children's
rights being denied if there is a higher crime rate in their housing project than in a wealthy
subdivision with a gatehouse and a twenty-four-hour guard? While this example may
seem extreme, the point is that the elevation of education to fundamental-right status could
have caused the demand for other fundamental rights.

18
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Even if the Court were somehow able to draft an opinion that made education a
fundamental right, while limiting the expansion of other alleged fundamental rights, how
would the role of the federal government change, with respect to education? Would the
federal government be required to contribute more than 10 percent to any state's education
budget? Would a whole new federal educational bureaucracy have to be created? What
would be the federal government's role? The majority may have felt questions such as
these were unanswerable.
Secondly, the majority may have been genuinely apprehensive about intruding into
legislative territory in the Rodriguez case. The Supreme Court is not a legislature.
Consequently, it certainly should not act as a super-legislature.

To do so would be to act

beyond the scope of the Court's legitimate powers as they were outlined in the
Constitution.

Not surprisingly, John Coons questioned the Court's alleged fear of acting

as a super legislature. In Coons's view, the Court did not hesitate to act in a legislative
capacity when it deemed such action necessary.
'It's true that in Rodriguez they acted like restrained and very proper
judges,' he said. 'But that certainly wasn't the situation in the abortion
cases, where you had these same justices reaching out and grabbing for
power, sweeping aside the judgment of .SO state legislatures, striking down
every abortion law in the country. They acted like legislators by going so
far as to set down what was constitutionally permissible in each month of
pregnancy. It was truly amazing, for they made it impossible for the state
legislatures to deal with the abortion issue again.'20
Regardless of whether Coons was correct in his evaluation of the Court's activities in the
abortion cases, the Supreme Court does not have the authority to create laws; it has only
the power to interpret them. Thus, if the majority believed it would be acting as a superlegislature by ruling for the plaintiffs, their hesitation was within the bounds of the
Constitution.

20
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Finally, the majority may have felt restricted by the text of the Constitution itself.
A provision for any type of education, let alone an education financing scheme, is
noticeably absent from the United States Constitution. Surely the founding fathers were
articulate enough to have included some provision for education, if they had been so
inclined. The strong inference to be drawn from the absence of education in the federal
constitution, might very well have been that it was not a fundamental right and the federal
government should leave public education matters to the states.

After all, education

clauses were present in almost every state constitution at the time of Rodriguez. 21 Perhaps
it was only logical for the Supreme Court to believe that remedies for these educational
finance problems would be found within the individual state constitutions, rather than in the
federal Constitution.

21
According to Marshall's dissent in Rodriguez, at the time of the case, 48 out of 50
states had such clauses.

74
The State Courts' Role
After the Rodriguez decision, however, some feared that state courts would be
unwilling to take on constitutional issues of such magnitude.22

Very few states outside

of Califomia and New Jersey23 had examined complex constitutional questions.24
During the two decades prior to Rodriguez, plaintiffs challenging
discrimination as unconstitutional had generally ignored state courts in favor
of the federal court system, which they perceived to be more receptive.
Therefore, most state courts lacked a tradition of creative constitutional
adjudication. At the time of the Rodriguez decision, state courts were long
shots for plaintiffs challenging discrimination in school finance systems.25
Thus, not only were the issues untested; so were the state courts themselves.
Potential plaintiffs' attorneys had to determine which types of cases were not
"doomed by the majority's declaration that education [was] not a fundamental interest."26
Although the Rodriguez case did not specifically prohibit challenges under the federal
Constitution, the chances for success were severely diminished.27 Cases which alleged
that education was a fundamental right under the United States Constitution could not
anticipate a high degree of success, and neither could cases based on federal equal
protection arguments would also be unsuccessful, but other potentially successful
arguments did exist

22
David C. Long, "Rodriguez: The State Courts Respond," Phi Delta Kappan
(March 1983): 481.
23
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Rodriguez did not automatically foreclose an examination of another state's school
financing system under the federal Constitution. A state with a financing system that
differed from the one in Texas could still be found to violate the United States Constitution.
See, Fair School Finance Council v. State, 746 P.2d 1135 (Okla. 1987).
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The first was through the individual state constitution's c1auses that were similar to
the federal equal protection clause. While, the Supreme Court had established guidelines
for reviewing the federal equal protection c1ause, it made no attempt to tell the states how to
interpret their own individual constitutions.

To take such an action would have been

beyond the Court's power. Thus, when evaluating its own equal protection clause, a state
court could look to either the rational relationship test (which had been employed by the
majority) or the strict scrutiny test (which was preferred by Marshall and the District
Court) for guidance.
The second likely route to success was through the clauses in the state constitution
that established the state's education.

(For purposes of brevity, throughout this

dissertation, these clauses will be referred to as state education clauses.)
As a matteroflaw, education in nearly every state [was] a function of state
not local government. In this regard, education is unlike sewer, police, or
fire departments. In virtually every state, school districts [were] considered
legal agencies of the state in carrying out its constitutional obligation to
provide a free public education to all children. Yet in carrying out this
obligation, the state compel[led] children to attend school districts having
vastly different resources.28
The plaintiffs' attorneys reasoned that if they could persuade the state courts to
acknowledge the irrationality of these constitutionally state-supported systems then their
arguments might be successful.
Why the Plaintiffs' Arguments Failed in the Supreme Court

Yet, it was also important to consider why the plaintiffs' arguments failed in the
Supreme Court. Hopefully, new plaintiffs could learn from errors made in Rodriguez and
by doing so, they could then form more effective arguments in the state courts. Some of
the possible plaintiffs' errors in Rodriguez are examined below.
Timing Considerations

28
David C. Long, "Rodriguez: The State Courts Respond," Phi Delta Kappan
(March 1983 ): 481.
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According to Coons, the Rodriguez decision reached the Supreme Court both too
late and too early. The decision reached the Court too late because it missed the period of
judicial activism that characterized the Court under the leadership of Chief Justice Earl
Warren.29 Coons was confident that had the Warren Court heard the exact same facts, it
would have ruled the other way. He believed that "[t]here was not much doubt as to how
[Supreme Court Justices] Earl Warren, Arthur Goldberg, and Abe Fortas would have
voted. 1130 In Coons's opinion, the decision reached the Court too early because the court
relied on an "ill-informed"3 l article in the Yale Law Journal, because the friends of the
plaintiffs were divided in their goals and because "the court had so little time to digest the
idea."32

In retrospect, some questioned whether the Rodriguez case reached the Supreme
Court, at a time when the school finance reform movement Jacked focus and was "really an
amalgamation of groups and individuals with various--and often competing--views on the
general subject of money and the schools. 1133 Indeed, those who argued for change did so
from several perspectives. "Egalitarians, "34 who believed that education's value would
vary from district to district, wanted money to be divided equally at the state level; they
were opposed to the idea that local citizens could or should make different decisions about
spending.

Another group believed that the Constitution should "guarantee spending

29
It was during the years of the Warren Court that the Brown decision was handed
down.

30
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according to the child's needs. "35 Yet, this group's definition of educational needs was
unclear, even to others in the education finance reform movement.36
Was Rodriguez the Best Case to Appear Before the Court?
There was also some thought among leaders of the school finance reform
movement that the Rodriguez case was not the best case to come before the Supreme Court.
Rodriguez was one of more than thirty cases that materialized after Serrano v. Priest37
(Serrano I) "first questioned the constitutionality of inequalities in school spending which
were caused by disparate taxable wealth. "38

Some other correlations between district

income and individual family income in Texas were weak.39 These weaknesses did not
escape the review of the Supreme Court and "[t]he introduction of demographic data
backfired on [the plaintiffs.]"40 A better case for the plaintiffs might "have come from
New Jersey, where personal poverty was very strongly associated with the poverty of the
tax base. 114 I
Conclusion
Typically, a decision like Rodriguez would not spur a great deal of action. It could
almost be considered a nondecision. Despite all the words, the close vote, and the strong
views both for and against the Texas school financing system, after the Rodriguez decision

35

Ibid.

36
John Coons was among those education finance reformers who were not certain of
the definition.
37

Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P. 2d 1241 (1971).
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was handed down, the state of Texas was under no federal constitutional obligation to
make any changes in its school financing system. It could still finance its schools through
a combination of federal, state, and local funds. It could still use the local property tax as a
major source of income. Neither Texas nor any other state with a similar financing system
(and that included just about every state) had to take any action whatsoever. As the next
chapter demonstrates, however, the next twenty years were full of activity in the world of
school finance reform, and much of that activity took place in the courtroom.

CHAPfERIV
SIGNIFICANT STATE COURT HISTORY AND DATA
AFfER THE RODRIGUFZ DECISION
Introduction
As noted in the previous chapters, the Rodriguez case initiated a flurry of activity in
state courts. People came to realize that education finance needed to be reformed, and if
those reforms would not take place in the Supreme Court, then they would have to occur
elsewhere. This chapter begins with a brief overview of the activity that took place, on the
state court level during this period. It then highlights individual state court decisions from
the time of the Rodriguez decision through 1993. A series of tables follows. The tables
present a nationRl pkture of ('O!!lpRrison Rnc:f ('.ontrnst

T~hJP

4, highlights the plaintiffs'

strategies in these cases by examining which state constitutional clauses were attacked in
the plaintiffs' arguments. Next,Table 6 details the states' education clauses as they existed
!n ! Q93 Rnd notes whether education was recognized as a fundamental right in the state.

Finally, Table 5, examines the outcomes of the cases in relation to the purported strength of
the state's education clause.
Overview 1973 to 1993
The Early History
As noted in the previous chapter, few state courts had experience with complicated
constitutional matters at the time of the Rodriguez decision. Federal courts had been the
favored arena for resolving social issues such as the ones surrounding school finance.
After Rodriguez, plaintiffs wondered how this major shift from federal court to state
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courts would affect the outcome of their cases. Plaintiffs did not have to wait long for an
answer.I
Only one month after the Rodriguez decision, the New Jersey Supreme Court
handed down its own ruling in a school finance case. In Robinson v. Cahill,2 the court
struck down the New Jersey system of school financing because it failed to provide the
"thorough and efficient" system of free public schools that was required by the education
clause of the New Jersey Constitution.
Robinson was no harbinger of easy plaintiff victories, however.

Many long years

oflitigation followed in other states.
Although the first response by a state court to the retreat of the
federal courts from school finance issues came quickly, school finance
litigation unfolded slowly during the three years following Rodriguez.
During this period plaintiffs did well in state trial courts. Between 1973
and 1976, trial courts in Idaho, California , and Connecticut found school
finance systems unconstitutional. However, supreme courts in four
western states followed the lead of the U.S. Supreme Court in Rodriguez
and found that inequalities in state school finance systems resulting from the
disparate fiscal capacities of school districts did not violate state
constitutions. 3
[These states were Arizona, Idaho, Oregon and
Washington].
Thus, the years immediately following Rodriguez brought mixed results, but school
finance reformers pushed ahead with additional litigation aimed at achieving equal
educational opportunity for all students.
As time passed, plaintiffs became more court-savvy. They were able to produce
more extensive court records because they had more witnesses and documents.4
Plaintiffs meticulously documented how the school financing systems
discriminate[d] against children as a result of the fiscal capacity of the
school district--a factor that [had] nothing to do with education. They also
1
David C. Long, "Rodriguez: The State Courts Respond," Phi Delta Kappan
(March 1983 ): 482.

2

Robinson v. Cahill, 62 NJ. 473, 303 A.2d 273 (1973).

3
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(March 1983 ): 482.
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documented the ways in which inequalities in financing resulted in unequal
educational facilities, staff, course offerings, equipment and instruction
materials. 5
Plaintiffs gathered evidence carefully and because there was more of it for the courts to
examine, trials took longer.6
"Beginning in late 1976, plaintiffs' fortunes in state courts changed dramatically
for the better. In general, the cases that reached state supreme courts during this period
were tried after Rodriguez and profited from lessons learned from earlier losses. "7

In late

1976, the California Supreme Court reaffirmed its 1971 Serrano v. Priest,8 (Serrano I)
holding.

In Serrano II, 9 the California Supreme Court held that education was a

fundamental right under the California Constitution regardless of its status under the federal
Constitution.

Soon afterward, state supreme courts in Connecticut, Washington and

Wyoming also found that their school finance systems were unconstitutional. Io
After 1976, however, plaintiffs began to suffer defeats in major state court cases.
Plaintiffs lost in state supreme court in Ohio, Colorado, Georgia and New York. School
finance reformers may have lost some of the momentum that they had gained from earlier
court victories.
The Early to Middle 1980s
As the 1970s moved into the 1980s, new concerns developed outside of education
finance and equal educational opportunity. For many Americans, higher taxes, inflation,
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and then recession, appeared to be far more immediate concerns. I I Furthermore, attentions
shifted in the education world as well. With the publication of A Nation at Risk in 1983, 12
education reform became the "consuming passion"l3 of the 1980s. Americans became
concerned with how they compared to other nations academically. Consequently, by 1983
the education reform movement "eclipsed the school finance reform movement of the
1970s."1 4
School finance litigation by no means disappeared during the 1980s.

Courts

continued to address many of the same factual scenarios that they had adjudicated in the
1970s, but new trends began to develop in the some of the case arguments. For example,
during the 1980s, several courts addressed the issue of municipal overburden. Municipal
overburden was an alleged disadvantage suffered by urban areas which had "enormous
demands for non-education-related services, such as welfare, health and immigration." 15
Plaintiffs argued that municipal overburden should be acknowledged in school funding
formulas. Municipal overburden was a controversial issue, not only in the courts where it
was alleged, but also in the school finance community. Some even doubted its existence.
Near the end of the 1980s, municipal overburden arguments in school finance cases were,
for the most part over.16
The Late 1980s and Early 1990s
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The late 1980s and early 1990s saw a resurgence in interest in school finance
cases. The exact cause behind this regeneration remains unknown. Some experts alleged
that it was a result of the growing disparity between rich and poor districts. Others alleged
that earlier lawsuits failed to reach acceptable results. Still others believed that the courts
had become more liberal and more protectionist, at least as far as education finance was
concerned.

Finally, according to some, educators began bringing the suits out of

frustration with their state legislators inability to reform school finance.1 7
The Failure of Equality and Equity
Furthermore, in the 1990s, after more than twenty years of frustration with trying
to bring about equal educational opportunity, some school finance reformers suggested
abandoning the equality and equity arguments.

To these reformers, attempts to bring

about equality or equity no longer seemed viable. Equality of spending, dollar for dollar,
would probably never occur; most school finance reformers came to this conclusion long
before Rodriguez ever reached the Supreme Court. Essentially, as mentioned in Chapter
1, different children often required different materials or equipment, which typically
translated into different amounts of money. Seemingly, this would make equity a good
solution to school finance problems. Consequently, for many years, school finance
reformers struggled to obtain equal educational opportunity for children through calls for
equity, but equity too had its problems. Even when state courts struck down the school
financing system as unconstitutional and inequitable, the actual changes in dollar amounts
for districts and educational opportunities for children were seldom seen. From 1983 to
1993, "states all over the country ... endured the same cycle of litigation, court decision,
attempted remedy and further litigation." 18

17
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Leveling
One of the only possible roads to equity appeared to have come through something
wealthy districts had feared since before Rodriguez: leveling.19

Some residents of

wealthier districts apprehensively equated the concept of equity with leveling.
The fear that comes across in many .. .letters [to the editor] and editorials...
is that democratizing opportunity will undermine diversity and even
elegance in our society and that the best schools will be dragged down to a
sullen norm, a mediocre middle ground of uniformity. References to
Eastern European socialism keep appearing in these letters. Visions of
Prague and Moscow come to mind: Equity means shortages of toilet tissue
for all students, not just for black kids in New Jersey or in Mississippi. An
impoverished vision of America seems to prevail in these scenarios.20
Thus, to many residents of property-wealthy districts, the process of leveling meant
distributing their money in other people's districts. In their eyes, equity would take their
money away from their own children.
Adequacy - A New Solution or a New Problem?
In the 1990s, a solution to educational finance problems appeared to develop.

School finance reformers began to speak in terms of adequacy rather than equity.
Adequacy mov[ed] away from an emphasis on dollar inputs--or how much
it [would] cost to bring poorer districts to fiscal parity with their wealthier
counterparts---towards a closer scrutiny of the things education dollars
[were] supposed to buy---teachers, curricula, test scores.21
Most of the education finance cases after 1989 spoke of adequacy as well as equity in their
arguments.22 Indeed, some argued that adequacy will virtually replace equity in school
finance cases, if it has not done so already. According to Michael Kirst, an educator
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professor at Stanford and the former president of the California Board of education,
"There is a general view in the school finance field that adequacy suits are not as
sophisticated or up-to-date as adequacy. "23
Thus, the post Rodriguez years were years of ever developing strategies for school
finance reformers and of active litigation for the state courts. For the most part, both the
reformers and the courts attempted, in their own ways, to improve the school finance
situation in the United States, although at times, because of their respective duties and
obligations, they appeared to work at cross purposes.

Unfortunately, in spite of such

efforts, as the next sections demonstrate, by 1993 conditions in property poor districts
were much the same as they were in 1973.

Case Highlights from State Courts 1973-1993
The Purpose of this Synopsis
By examining individual state court cases, this dissertation explores how the United
States, as a nation, responded to the decision of its highest court.

The Rodriguez case

impacted education and education financing not only in Texas, but throughout the country.
Many states had factual scenarios as compelling as those found in Texas. Not surprisingly.
then, the history of education finance in many individual states, is worth additional study.
(See Chapter V's Recommendations.) This dissertation does not attempt to examine the
particular histories of every state's response to Rodriguez. Rather, it presents an overview
of the significant state court cases that followed Rodriguez.
1973
Miliken v. Green, 390 Mich. 389, 212 N.W. 2d 711 (1973)
The governor of the state brought a suit for declaratory judgment, hoping to
determine the constitutionality of the state's school financing system.

In December of

23
Charles Mahtesian, "The Quagmire of Education Finance," Governing (September
1993): 45.
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1972, the Supreme Court of Michigan had found the school financing system to be
"constitutionally infirm"2 4

based on the equal protection clause of the Michigan

Constitution. On January 30, 1973, the court granted a rehearing. After the rehearing
and the results of the Rodriguez case, the court vacated its earlier pronouncements and gave
new answers to the certified questions. Based upon the Rodriguez authority, it found no
violation of the federal equal protection clause. Furthermore, it found no violation against
Michigan's equal protection clause. Finally, the Michigan Supreme Court indicated that
the Michigan Constitution did not prohibit districts from using local property taxes as a
source of revenue, nor did it require the state to supplement other districts or take any other
measure to even out the distribution of school funds.
Robinson v. Cahill, 62 NJ. 473, 303 A.2d 273 (1973)
This case, handed down only one month after the Rodriguez Supreme Court
decision,25 "was the first case in which a state supreme court relied on the education
provisions of a state constitution, rather than on equal protection requirements, to find the
funding of schools unconstitutional. 11 26 The case, which came to be known as Robinson
!,27 was important for several other reasons as well. For example, in Robinson "[t]he

New Jersey court condemned not only the inequalities resulting from inadequate tax bases,
but also those resulting form inadequate tax efforts. In addition, the court held that the
state had never spelled out the content of the educational opportunity mandated by the state
constitution. 11 28
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Shofstall v. Hollins, 110 Ariz. 88, 515 P.2d 590 (1973)
The plaintiffs alleged that the disparities in Arizona's school finance system violated
the equal protection clauses of the United States and of the State of Arizona.

After the

appeal to the Arizona Supreme Court was filed in this case, the United States Supreme
Court handed down its decision in Rodriguez and the Arizona court found that the federal
equal protection question had been answered. The court also found that there was no state
equal protection violation because the school financing system was rationally related to a
legitimate state goal. Interestingly, though, the court also declared that under the language
of the Arizona Constitution's education clause, education was a fundamental right in
Arizona.29
1974
Northshore School District No, 417 v. Kinear, 84 Wash.2d 685, 530 P.2d 178 (1974)
In this case the plaintiffs alleged that the Washington school financing system
violated both the federal and state equal protection clauses, as well as the state
constitution's education clause.30 The Washington Supreme Court found that "the record
[did] not bear out these claims of unconstitutional inequality of educational opportunity. "31
Consequently, the court deferred to the legislative determination of the scope of education
to be provided in the state.32

29
In a 1994 case, Roosevelt Elementary School Dist. v. Bishop, 877 P.2d 806, 811
(Ariz. 1994), the Arizona Supreme Court questioned the court's reasoning in Shofshall
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1975
Thompson v. Engelking, 96 Idaho 793, 537 P.2d 635 (1975)
In this case, the Idaho Supreme Court reviewed the decision of the District Court.
The District Court had found that Idaho's school financing system, which relied heavily on
ad valorum taxes, violated the Idaho Constitution because it failed to provide a uniform
system of public schools. The District Court had found no violation of the state's equal
protection clause. On appeal the Idaho Supreme Court found that neither the education
clause nor the equal protection clause was violated.
1976
Olsen v. State, 276 Or.9, 554 P.2d 139 (1976)
In this case that came before the Oregon Supreme Court, the plaintiffs contended

that the Oregon system of public school financing violated both the equal protection and
education clauses of the Oregon Constitution.33 The essence of the plaintiffs' argument
[was] that under the Oregon system the amount of money available for education
depend[ed] upon the value of the property in the individual school districts and this varie[d]
greatly.

They further contend[ed] that this variation in wealth result[ed] in unequal

educational opportunities for the children of the state.34
In its analysis, the court noted that there were three types of districts in Oregon:
unified, elementary ,and secondary and that substantial spending disparities existed
between like districts.35

The court then referred to the recent Rodriguez case, but

acknowledged that it could decide that the equal protection clause of the Oregon
Constitution was broader than that of the federal Constitution.3 6
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The court used the
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balancing test employed by the New Jersey Supreme Court in Robinson v. Cahill 37 to
evaluate the plaintiffs' equal protection arguments. The Oregon Supreme Court found no
violation of state equal protection.3 8

Furthermore, the court found that the education

clause of the Oregon Constitution (which called for a "uniform" system of public schools)
did not require spending equality among like districts.

Thus, the education clause

argument was likewise rejected.39 As in the Rodriguez case, however, the court stated
that its rulings in this case were not an endorsement of the status quo in school financing.
The court declared: "Our decision should not be interpreted to mean that we are of the
opinion that the Oregon system of school financing is politically or educationally desirable.
Our only role is to pass upon its constitutionality. "40
People ex. rel. Jones v. Adams, 40 Ill. App.3d 189, 350 N.E.2d 767 (1976)
Citizens of a rural district in Illinois paid their 1971 and 1972 property taxes under
protest, and alleged, in part, that the 111inois method of financing public education violated
the equal protection clauses of the United States Constitution, and the Illinois Constitution.
The citizens, who were the defendants in this case, were taxed locally at an above-average
rate, but per student spending still fell $165 below the state average.41 The court found
that "Illinois' method of financing public schools before 1973 was expressly held to be
constitutional in Mcinnis v. Shapiro. "42

Even under the standards adopted in Rodriguez,
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Rodriguez, which "displaced"43 those in Mclnnis, the taxpayer defendants failed to prove
discrimination.
At trial the defendants did not elicit any testimony concerning the
discriminatory aspects of Illinois' method of financing public schools
during 1971 and 1972. Although the defendants introduced in evidence
several exhibits which contained information relevant to this subject, they
made little effort to separate the information from the large volume of other
material in the exhibits. The defendants have not offered an analysis of
what the statistics included in their exhibits prove. They have not
introduced evidence concerning the adequacy of education provided by
school districts in Franklin County, and they have not introduced evidence
concerning the size of the disparity in expenditures per pupil between school
districts in Franklin County and wealthy school districts in the state.44
The defendants arguments were t})us rejected by the court.
Robinson v. Cahill, 69 NJ. 449, 355 A. 2d 129 (1976)
In this case, which came to be known as Robinson V, the New Jersy Supreme
Court upheld the constitutionality of the legislative reforms that had been instigated in
response to Robinson I. 45 The primary focus of the case was on the statutory provisions
used to implement "the state's responsibility to define and monitor the adequacy of
education delivered by the school districts.

Secondary attenetion [was] given to

sufficeincy of provisions for financial support and to steps toward elimination of gross
disparities in funding.46
Serrano v. Priest, 18 Cal. 3d 729, 557 P.2d 929 (1976)
This case became known as Serrano II because it followed the original 1971
Serrano v. Priest case, 5 Cal 3d 584, 96 Cal Rptr. 601, 487 P.2d 1241 (which afterwards
became known as Serrano I.) Prior to the Rodriguez decision, in Serrano I, the California
Supreme Court had found that the California school financing system violated both the state
43
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and federal equal protection clauses. In Serrano II, the court acknowledged that the
Rodriguez decision "undercut 11 47 its federal equal protection ruling in Serrano I, but
nonetheless, the court found that a state equal protection violation still existed.48
Although the state legislature had attempted to changed the system (which relied on local
property taxes for much of its funding) the California Supreme Court found that the
changes were inadequate because the basic structure of the system was unchanged; i.e. it
was still a "foundation level" system.49
1977
Horton v. Meskill, 376 A. 2d 359 (1977)
The Connecticut Supreme Court in this case (Horton I) found that the state's
system of school financing, which relied heavily on local property taxes, violated the state
equal protection clause. 50 At the time of the initial trial,
Connecticut ranked fiftieth among states in its efforts to distribute aid in
such a way as to equalize the abilities of various towns to finance education,
ranked forty-seventh in the percent of educational funding coming from the
state and second in the percent of education funding coming form local
govemments. 51
The court used Rodriguez in its equal protection analysis,54 but found that education was a
fundamental right under the Connecticut Constitution and that the "[b]asic and fundamental
nature of [the] right to education necessitat[ed strict scrutiny of wealth-based variations,
with [the] result that substantial equality of educational opportunity [was] required." 53
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1978

Seattle School Dist. No. 1 v. State, 90 Wash. 2d 476, 585 P.2d 71 (1978)
"Faced with a deteriorating plant, a reduction in budget for books, supplies, staff
and programs and a double levy failure petitioners (respondents and cross-appellants
brought this action"54 on appeal to the Supreme Court of Washington. The petitioners
alleged that "the State had failed to discharge its 'paramount duty' to make 'ample
provision' for the education of its resident children pursuant to Const., art 9, § 1 and 'to
provide for a general and uniform system of public schools' pursuant to Const., art 9., §

2. 55
11

Based upon these claims, the Washington Supreme Court upheld the decision of the
lower court5 6 which had invalidated the school financing system's reliance on local
property taxes.5 7 The court rejected the appellants call for judicial restraint and asserted
that it was not acting beyond the scope of its constitutionally granted powers.58 Finally,
the court determined that the state legislature had the responsibility to define the scope of a
basic education and to make the adequate provision for funding education statewide. 59
1979
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Jn this case, the Supreme Court of Ohio addressed two common issues in state
school finance litigation. First, did the state's school financing system violate the equal
protection clause of the Ohio Constitution? Secondly, did the system violate the state's
education clause?60
The court looked to the Rodriguez decision for guidance, but noted that it was "not
helpful in determining whether a right was fundamental under the Ohio Constitution."61
Thus, even though education was mentioned explicitly in the Ohio Constitution, the court
did not find education to be a fundamental right in Ohio. The court also found this case
inappropriate for evaluation under the strict scrutiny test. Consequently, using the rational
relationship test, the court found no violation of the state's equal protection clause. 62
The court also failed to find a violation of the state's education clause. The court
acknowledged its responsibility to review legislation, and "that the wide General Assembly
discretion granted to the General Assembly [--here with respect to school finance litigation-was] not without limits."63 In this case, however, the Ohio Supreme Court found that the
General Assembly acted within its constitutionally granted powers when it established the
school financing system. 64
Danson v. Casey, 484 Pa. 415, 399 A 2d 360 (1979)
In this case the plaintiffsfappellants alleged that, due to inadequate revenues,
students in the Philadelphia School District received "only a 'truncated and uniquely limited
program of educational services. "'65 The appellants did
60
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not purport to challenge any particuJar portion of either the state subsidy or
local taxation aspects of the scheme. Instead, appellants basic constitutional
claim [was] that, viewed as a whole, the Pennsylvania system of school
financing fail[ed] to provide Philadelphia's public school children with a
thorough and efficient education and deni[ed] them equaJ educational
opportunity solely because of their residence in the School District of
Philadelphia. 66
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania found that the plaintiffs' "broad and general"67
cha11enge (brought in part under the state's education clause)

to the state's school

financing system "failed to state a justicable cause of action. 11 68
Pauly v. Ke11y, 162 W.Va. 672, 255 S.E.2d 859 (1979)
In 1975, the plaintiffs filed a class action lawsuit alleging violations of the state's
equal protection and education clauses. The circuit court granted the defendants motion to
dismiss the case, but the plaintiffs appealed. The West Virginia Supreme Court found that
"[t]he mandatory requirements of a 'thorough and efficient system of free schools found in
Article XII, Section 1 of the West Virginia Constitution, made education a fundamental
right in this State." 69 The court also found that the state's equal protection clause was
violated because there was no compelling state interest which justified the unequal
classifications brought about by the system.70 The court then called upon the legislature
to develop a new "high quality" system and subsequently remanded the case to the circuit
court. 7 1
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95
Three school districts, together with their school board members and several
students had alleged, in District Court, that the Wyoming school financing system violated
the equal protection clause of the state constitution. When the District Court granted the
state's motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' challenge, the plaintiffs appealed. Unlike the
Rodriguez court, the Wyoming Supreme Court found that

education~

a fundamental

right under the Wyoming Constitution. Furthermore, the Wyoming court accepted the
argument that wealth was a suspect class and ruled that the compelling state interest test
should be applied to evaluate the state's equal protection clause.

Finally, the court

concluded that "until equality of financing is achieved, there is no practicable method of
achieving equality of quality."

The court then reversed the decision and remanded the

case to the trial court.
1981
McDaniel v. Thomas, 248 Ga. 632, 285 S.E. 2d 156 (1981)
Georgia parents, children, and school officials who resided in school districts with
low property tax bases alleged that the school financing system violated the Georgia equal
protection clause and also failed to provide the "adequate education" that was required by
the Georgia Constitution. The trial court found that the school financing system did violate
the state's equal protection clause, but it rejected the plaintiffs' claims that the state failed to
provide an adequate education.

On appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court found that

"adequate education" did not "require the state to equalize educational opportunities
between districts" 72 and that the more than l billion dollars the state allocated to education
was proof of its adequacy. 7 3

Beyond this evaluation of "adequacy," the court did not

want to act as a "super-legislature"

The court applied the rational relationship test to its

evaluation of the state's equal protection clause and found that the educational finance
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system did not violate the Georgia Constitution. The court declared, however, that its
holding "should not be construed as this court's endorsement of the status quo ... [but that]
solutions must come from our lawmakers. "74
1982
Levittown Union Free School Dist. v. Nyquist, 57 N.Y.S. 2d 27, 453 N.Y.S.2d 643, 439
N.E. 2d 359
The New York Court of Appeals (the highest court in the state) overturned the
decisions of two lower courts that had previously found in favor of plaintiffs who
challenged the school financing system.

The court used the rational basis test from

Rodriguez to find that there was no violation of either federal or state equal protection.
Furthermore, the court held that the state abided by the state constitutional mandate to
provide for the maintenance and support of free common elementary and secondary
schools. In addition, the court rejected the plaintiffs claim that "metropolitan overburden"
(which alleged that inequalities were a result of "demographic, economic and political
factors intrinsic to cities"75 was a result of legislative action or inaction.76
Lujan v. Colorado State Board of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005 (Colo. 1982)
The trial court had determined that the Colorado school financing system, which
relied heavily on local taxes, was unconstitutional on both state and federal equal protection
grounds, as well as the "thorough and uniform" requirement of the education clause of the
state's constitution. The Colorado Supreme Court reversed.

It found no equal protection

violations because the financing system was "rationally related to a legitimate state
purpose. "77
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Yet, the court did not specifically endorse the status quo, as far as the school
financing system was concerned.
Whether a better financing system could be devised is not material to this
decision, as our sole function is to rule on the constitutionality of our state's
system. This decision should not be read to indicate that we find
Colorado's school financing system to be without fault or not requiring
further legislative improvements. Our decision today declares only that it is
constitutionally permissible.78
Thus, the Colorado Supreme Court exercised judicial restraint in its evaluation of the issues
in Lujan.
1983
Dupree v. Alama School Dist. No. 30, 279 Ark. 340, 651S.W.2d90 (1983)
In Dupree, the plaintiffs contended that
[T]he great disparity in funds available for education to school districts
throughout the state [was] due primarily to the fact that the major
determinative of revenue throughout the state [was] the local tax base, a
basis unrelated to the educational needs of any given district and that the
...state financing system [was] inadequate to rectify the inequalities inherent
in a system based on widely varying local tax bases, and actually widens the
gap between the property-poor and property-wealthy districts in providing
educational opportunities.79
The trial court found that the Arkansas school financing system violated the education and
equal protection clauses of the Arkansas Constitution, and the Supreme Court upheld the
trial courts' ruling. The Supreme Court of Arkansas upheld the trial court's finding that
the Arkansas school financing system violated the education and equal protection clauses of
the Arkansas Constitution.
Hornbeck v. Somerset County Board of Education, 295 Md. 597, 458 S.2d 758 (1983)
In this case, the Supreme Court of Maryland overturned an earlier circuit court
decision which had found that the state's school financing system violated both the state
and federal equal protection clauses and the state constitutional clause requiring a "thorough
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and efficient" system of free pubJic schools. The Maryland Supreme Court applied the
rational relationship test to its evaluation of the equaJ protection clauses and found no equal
protection violations.

Even though students from property-poor districts could not

produce funds to the same extent as students in property-rich districts, nonetheless, the
court deemed their education was stilJ adequate.

Furthermore, the court held that a

"thorough and efficient" system of free public schools "did not mandate exact equality of
per pupil funding and expenditures among districts. "80
1984
East Jackson PubJic Schools v. State, 133 Mich. App. 132, 348 N.W. 2D 303 (1984)
In this case, the plaintiffs appealed a circuit court's ruling which had found the
state schooJ system to be vaJid under the Michigan Constitution.
The plaintiffs' thesis, as interpreted by the [appellate] court, was that a state
school financing system which did not produce equal funding per pupiJ in
each school district throughout the state was not permissible under the
Michigan state constitution. The [appellate] court's determination was that
the legislative mandate to establish a system of free public education was not
synonymous with providing equal per pupil funding between aJl school
districts. 81
Thus, the appellate court upheld the circuit court's decision.
PauJey v. Bailey, 174 W.Va. 167, 324 S.E. 2d 128 (1984)
This case followed the implementation of the Master Plan for Education that was
devised by the legislature after Pauly v. Kelly. 82 Plaintiffs alleged that the "circuit court
erred, perhaps inadvertently, when it failed to specifically order the implementation and
enforcement of the Master Plan. 11 83 The plaintiffs were particularly interested in imposing

8o80 Hornbeck v. Somerset County Board of Education, 295 Md. 597, 458 S.2d 758,
776, (1983).

81 Mary Jane Connelly and Jack McGee, "School Finance Litigation of the 1980s." Journal
of Education Finance 12 (Spring 1987): 580
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Pauly v. Kelly, 162 W.Va. 672, 255 S.E.2d 859 (1979).

83

Pauley v. Bailey, 174 W.Va. 167, 324 S.E. 2d 128, 133 (1984).
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"a specific timetable for full implementation of the Master Plan."8 4

The court did not

consider it appropriate to recommend a timetable and thus, remanded the case to the circuit
court for further monitoring. 85
1985
Abbott v. Burke, 100 NJ. 269 (1985)
The school finance system that had been enacted by the legislature after the
Robinson v. Cahill decision was challenged in court, but the court referred the case to an
administrative hearing.86 The case would reappear before the New Jersy Supreme Court
in 1990.87
Horton v. Meskill, 187 Conn. 187, 486 A.2d 1099 (1985)
This case, part of a long line of school finance litigation in Connecticut, became
known as Horton II. At the trial level in Horton II, the court examined the 1979 legislative
response to the Horton I's call for a new school finance scheme and found that it was
inadequate. On appeal, the court found that the Horton II trial court had erred in reaching
its decision. First, the trial court used the compelling state interest standard to evaluate the
funding formulas when the appropriate test called for only a rational relationship between
the formula and a legitimate state purpose. Secondly, the trial court "had failed to afford
all interested parties an opportunity to be heard regarding remediation of constitutional
infirmities. "88

Consequently, the Connecticut Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality

of the power-equalization financing system that had been adopted after Horton I, on the
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grounds that it significantly narrowed the disparities between rich and poor districts.89
The court the remanded the claims that amendments passed subsequently to the new system
unconstitutionally delayed the implementation of the system.90
1986
Serrano v. Priest, 226 Cal. Rptr. 584 (Cal. App. 1986)
This case, part of the ongoing struggle for school finance reform in California,
became known as Serrano III. The plaintiffs cJaimed that in spite of the attempts at reform
that followed Serrano I and Serrano II, unacceptable funding disparities still existed.91 By
the time the Serrano III decision was handed down, the school finance system in California
had again changed due to a taxpayers' revolt92 and the implementation of Proposition 13.93
In this case, however, the court ruled "as did the trial court that remaining differences in

spending [were] not significant, either mathematically or educationally."94

Furthermore,

even had the differences been significant, they would have been justified by many state
interests relating to the necessity of a uniform and adaptable budget.95
1987
Fair School Finance Council v. State, 746 P.2d 1135 (Okla. 1987)
On appeal in this class action suit, the plaintiffs argued that the school financing
system in Oklahoma violated the equal protection laws of both the United States and
89
Peter Enrich, "Leaving Equality Behind: New Directions in School Finance
Reform," 48 Vanderbilt Law Review (1995): 189.
90
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Serrano v. Priest, 226 Cal. Rptr. 584, 589(Cal. App. 1986).

92
Peter Enrich, "Leaving Equality Behind: New Directions in School Finance
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Oklahoma constitutions.96 In addition, to these fairly standard arguments, the plaintiffs
made two unique arguments. First, they 11 contend[ed] that it [was] a violation of both due
process and equal protection to require children to attend schools under penalty for them
and their parents without requiring some standard of equality in the public support of those
schools. "97 Secondly, they argued that the school financing system violated Article 5 §§
59 and 46 of the Oklahoma Constitution. "Section 59 requir[ed] that general laws have a

uniform operation throughout the state and that no special Jaw be enacted where a general
law [could] be made and Section 46 prohibit[ed] any special or local law 'regulating the
affairs' of school districts. 11 98
The court rejected all of these arguments. As to the federal Constitutional claims,
the court found Rodriguez to be controlling. There was "no requirement under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution that a
state's school financing system guarantee equal expenditures per child. 11 99

In addition,

because the court did not accept the plaintiffs argument for the application of strict judicial
scrutiny to the state equal protection cJause, the plaintiffs arguments under the state equal
protection clause also failed.
arguments.

Finally, the court rebuffed the plaintiffs two unusual

The Oklahoma Supreme Court declared that "[w]hatever merit [the

compulsory attendance argument had] it [was] of no avail where a charge [could] not be
fairly made that a child[was] not receiving at least a basic adequate education, 11 100
(emphasis in the original). Lastly, the court rejected the arguments brought under Article 5
§§ 59 and 46 of the Oklahoma Constitution. The state had a rational basis for its school
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102
financing system and the laws that regulated the affairs of the school district were not
impermissible simply because some districts could act with greater freedom under those
laws, due to a superior financial situation within the district 1o1
Britt v. North Carolina State Board of Education. 86 N.C. App. 282, 357 S.E.2d 432,
app. dismissed 361 S.E.2d 71 (1987)
After the Superior Court of North Carolina dismissed their complaint alleging a
violation of the state's education clause, the plaintiffs (the present and future students of
public schools in Robeson County, North Carolina) brought their case to the Court of
Appeals of North Carolina.102

On appeal, the plaintiffs alleged that the state's school

financing system was unconstitutional because it depended in large part on local tax bases
and it resulted in the denial of the plaintiffs' fundamental right to equal educatfonal
opportunity . 103
According to the court, "the outcome of this appeal depended entirely on the
interpretation to be given the constitutional provisions relied upon by the plaintiffs." 104 If
the court interpreted the constitution in the same manner as the plaintiffs (who believed that
equal educational opportunity was a fundamental right) then the court would be able to
redress the plaintiffs claim. If the court did not agree with the plaintiffs' interpretation of
the North Carolina Constitution, however, it would be therefore compelled to affirm the
lower court's dismissal.

The court looked to the legislative history surrounding the

development of the education clause and to the text of the education clause itself in order to
reach its conclusion. It found that neither the constitutional history nor the text of the
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432, 433 app. dismissed 361 S.E.2d 71 (1987).
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document supported the plaintiffs' claims. Therefore, the appeJJate court upheld the lower
court's dismissal. I 05
1988
Richland County v. Campbell, 294 S.C. 346, 364 S.E. 2d 470 (1988)

In this brief opinion, the Supreme Court rejected the plaintiffs' claims that the
school financing system in South Carolina violated both the education and equal protection
clauses of the South Carolina Constitution. 106 The appellants asserted that the South
Carolina public school financing system produced "disparate revenue and unequal
educational opportunities because it [was] based upon formulas that [took] into account the
individual wealth of the various school districts."107 The court found that "[a]pparently
plaintiffs interpreted [the education] provision as requiring the legislature to 'pay' for the
cost of the public school system rather than to 'provide' for its maintenance and
support." 108 The court found the legislative acts that devised the state's school finance
plan to be a valid means of providing for education.
The court also refuted the appellants equal protection claim.

According to the

court, the school financing plan in South Carolina differed from plans which relied heavily
upon property local taxes.

Though the court did not describe in detail the differences

between South Carolina's method and the method which relied on property local taxes, it
nonetheless declared that South Carolina "school districts which lack a sufficient tax base
receive proportionally more state funds and are required to pay proportionally less local
revenue for public school operation,"109 (emphasis in the original).

Based on these

conclusions, the supreme court affirmed the decision of the trial court.
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1989
Edgewood Independent School District v. Kirby, 777 S.W. 2d 391 (Tex. 1989)
Sixteen years after the Supreme Court's Rodriguez decision, the undisputed facts of
another Texas case, Edgewood v. Kirby,
showed that the disparity between the richest and poorest districts in Texas
was more than 700 to 1. The 300,000 students in the poorest districts had
Jess than 3 percent of the state's wealth to support their education, while the
300,000 students in the richest districts had more than 25 percent of the
state's wealth.110
The Court wrote, "More money allocated under the present system would reduce some of
the existing disparities between districts but would at best only postpone the reform that is
necessary to make the system efficient. A Band-aid will not suffice; the system itself must
be changed." 111
Helena Elementary School District No. 1 v. State, 236 Mont. 44, 769 P.2d 684 (1989)
In this action for declaratory judgment, the Montana Supreme Court affirmed the
District Court's holding that the system of educational financing in Montana violated the
Montana Constitution, but the Supreme Court drew its conclusions based upon narrower
grounds that those used by the District Court. At the District Court level, the plaintiffs had
"presented voluminous evidence to support their theory that the system of funding public
education in Montana [was] unconstitutional."112

For example, the plaintiffs had

provided data which demonstrated that per pupil spending disparities were as high as 8 to
1.113 The District Court had concluded that education was a fundamental right under the
109
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Montana Constitution and that the state's equal protection clause, as well as the state's
education clause had been violated On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court found that the
state "failed to provide a system of quality education granting to each student the equality
of educational opportunity guaranteed under Art. X, Sec. 1, Mont. Const."114 Because
the court found the financing system to be invalid under the education clause of the
Montana Constitution, it found no reason to consider the equal protection issue.115
Furthermore, the court refused to consider whether education was a fundamental right
under the Montana Constitution.116
Kukor v. Grover, 148 Wis. 2d 469, 436 N.W.2d 568 (1989)
The plaintiffs in this case alleged that the state aid formula violated the education
and equal protection clauses of the Wisconsin Constitution.

After the circuit court

dismissed the plaintiffs claim, the case came before the Wisconsin Supreme Court on
certification from the court of appeals.
judgment of the circuit court.

The Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed the

First, the court found that "while greater uniformity in

educational opportunities is ... desirable and necessary, it is not something which is
constitutionally mandated under the uniformity provision [of the education clause.]"117
Secondly, citing Rodriguez and advocating local control as a legitimate state interest, the
court found no violation of state equal protection.118 finally, the court suggested while
education finance matters were extremely important and changes in the system might be
beneficial, the duty to make such changes fell upon the legislature and the community.119
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Rose v. Council for Better Education, 790 S.W. 2d 186 (Ky. 1989)
Called "the mother of all adequacy suits," 120 the court in this Kentucky case ruled
that the school financing system was both inadequate and inequitable.

The Kentucky

Supreme Court "threw out virtually everything--the mechanism for funding education and
aIJ the Jaws creating districts, school boards and the state education department.

AIJ

regulations regarding teacher certification and school construction were declared
unconstitutional as well." 121
1990
Abbott v. Burke, 119 N.J. 449, 355 A.2d 359 (1990).
Although New Jersey led the nation in funding its schools,122 disparities had
increased since the New Jersey Supreme Court's ruling in Robinson v. Cahill.

In this

case the New Jersey Supreme Court wrote: "[f]he extent of failure is so deep, its causes
so embedded in the present system, as to persuade us that there is no likelihood of
achieving a decent education tomorrow, in the recent future or ever. 11 123

In spite of its

pessimistic view for hope of reform, the court nonetheless invalidated the school fiancne
system that had been approved after Robinson V, "on the gorunds of stark failures of poor
urban school districts to enable students to compete with those from wealthier suburban
districts."124
119

The court ordered the elimination of differences between rich and poor
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districts and also increased funding of poor urban school districtsl25 (essentially
acknowledging the fact that they had special needsdue to municipal overburden.)
1991
Coalition for Equitable School Funding v. State. 311 Or. 300, 811 P.2d 116 (1991)
The plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment holding that the Oregon system of
public school finance violated the state constitution, but the Oregon Supreme Court found
that the plaintiffs failed to plead a valid claim for relief.126 The plaintiffs had hoped the
court would overturn the earlier Olsen 127 case which upheld the system of school financing
in the state, but according to the court, the Oregon Constitution had changed in a relevant
way since 1976 when Olsen was decided.128 The people [had] added a new provision that
address[ed] specifically how public schools were to be funded ... 11 129 According to the
court, "When a party argues that a general constitutional provision forbids the state from
doing something, the argument may be answered by a later adopted constitutional provision
that allows he state to do that very thing." 130
The court found that in this case the voters had added a provision to their
constitution known as the "Safety Net."131

The Safety Net specifically addressed the

funding of public schools and permitted both the use of local tax dollars to support
education and district-to-district disparities.132 In essence, the plaintiffs claim had already
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In this case, which came to be known as Edgewood III, the court examined the
legislative response to Edgewood II. After Edgewood II, the Texas State Legislature
pooled property tax wealth and equalized taxing capacity through the creation of
consolidated county-wide taxing districts.

In Edgewood III, the court found that this

system violated the Texas Constitution because it was a form of state-level property
taxation, which was prohibited by the constitution.137
Tennessee SmaJI School Systems v. McWberter, Appeal No.01-A-01-9111-CH-00433,
1992 Tenn. App. LEXIS 486
See Tennessee Small School Systems v. McWherter, 851 S.W. 2d 139 (Ten.
1993) in the 1993 Section for more on this case.
1993
Alabama Coalition for Equity v. Hunt, 624 So. 2d 107 (Ala. 1993)
Circuit Court Judge Eugene Reese declared the Alabama school finance system
unconstitutional under Alabama's equal protection clause and its education clause. In
considering whether or not education should be a fundamental right in Alabama, the court
found that Rodriguez did not control.138 The court wrote that "[p]ublic education is the
state's chief instrument for stimulating economic growth, fostering civic responsibility,
exposing the citizenry to social values, preparing students for professional training, and
protection our democratic form of govemment."139 Based on these assertions, the court
also found that education was a fundamental right in Alabama.140
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The court found that it was the state's responsibility to "establish, organize, and
maintain"l41 a system of free public schools where students would have the opportunity to
obtain: (1) "sufficient oral and written communications skills"; (2) "sufficient mathematics
and scientific skills"; (3) "sufficient knowledge of economic, social, and political systems
generally, and of the history, politics and social structure of Alabama and the United States,
specifically to enabled the student to make informed choices"; (4) sufficient understanding
of government and civics; (5) sufficient "self-knowledge," including health and mental
hygiene; (6) "sufficient understanding of the arts to enable each student to appreciate his or
her cultural heritage and the cultural heritages of others"; (7) sufficient academic,
vocational and guidance training "to choose and pursue life work intelligently"; (8)
sufficient ski1Js to enable student to compete with others in the state, country and world, in
the job market and academics; and (9) "sufficient support and guidance so that every
student feels a sense of self-worth and ability to achieve, and so that every student is
encouraged to live up to his or her full human potential."142

The court did not define

"sufficient" in this context.
Gould v. Orr, 244 Neb. 163, 506 N.W.2d 349 (1993)
The court dismissed claims that the wide spending disparities violated Nebraska's
education and equal protection clauses (and uniform taxation.) The court found that the
plaintiffs failed to state facts sufficient to support a cause of action because they did not
allege that the disparities caused the educational inadequacies.143
Claremont School District v. Governor, 138 N.H. 183, 635 A.2d 1375 (1993)
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In this case,144 the court found that the education clause of the New Hampshire

Constitution required the state to provide adequate funding for broad educational
opportunities for all children.

The court remanded the case to the lower court for a

determination as to whether or not the existing system fulfilled the state's obligation.
Idaho Schools for Equal Educational Opportunity v. Evans, 123 Idaho 573, 850 P.2d 724
(1993)

The plaintiffs in a group of consolidated cases alleged, on appeal, that the method
of funding public schools in Idaho (1) provide neither a uniform nor an efficient system
and also (2) violated the state equal protection clause.

The court found Thompson v.

Engelking, 96 Idaho 793, 537 P.Ed. 635 (1975) to be controlling. The court's language
in Thompson was not dicta, 145 and the court in that case reached the correct result In this
case, like the Thompson case, the rational basis test was the appropriate standard of
review.
McDuffy v. Secretary of Executive Office of Education, 415 Mass. 545, 615 N.E.2d 516
(1993)

In this Massachusetts case the plaintiffs claimed that the state's school financing
system denied them an adequate education in violation of the state's education clause. The
plaintiffs alleged crowded classes, inadequate teaching, lack of curriculum development,
inadequate guidance counseling and unpredictable funding made the school financing
system unconstitutionaI.146

The court extensively examined the history of the

Massachusetts education clause147 and upon doing so, agreed with the plaintiffs. The case
144
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was then remanded to a lower court to determine whether, within a reasonable time,
appropriate legislative action [had] been taken. "148
Reform Educational Financing Inequities Today (R.E.F.I.T.) v. Cuomo, 199 A.D.2d.
488, 606 n.Y. S. 2d 44 (1993)
In this case, the property-poor plaintiffs asserted that they did not have the funds to
compete with their wealthier neighbors who were able to provide better educational services
as a result of their higher tax base. The plaintiffs insisted that the school finance situation
had grown worse since the New York public school financing system was upheld almost
ten years earlier in Board of Educ. Levittown Union Free School Dist. v. Nyquist.

The

plaintiffs cited the folJowing as evidence of the worsening situation: ( 1) a widening taxbase gap between the rich and poor; (2) growing disparities in per pupil expenditures in
spite of poor districts' attempts to increase their own taxes; (3) unnamed severe real life
consequences resulted from these increasing disparities; (4) a disproportionate increase in
high risk students; (5) the "burdensome imposition" of state mandates upon JocaJ districts
which were unable to raise the finances necessary to meet these mandates; (6) the failure of
the legislature to act upon the appeIJate court's "invitation" to reform the school financing
system; and (7) the fact that the state budget crisis had a disproportionate effect on poor
districts because of reductions in state aid.149
The court found that in spite of all these claims, the plaintiffs never alleged that
"their students were not being provided with a sound, basic education." 150 The plaintiffs
aJlegations--that disparities existed between districts--had already been addressed in
Levittown.

The New York Court of Appealsl51 had already found that disparities were

constitutionaIJy permissible.
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Skeen v. State, 505 N.W. 2d 299 (Minn. 1993)
The plaintiffs in this case were rapidly growing suburban school districts with
relatively low property values.152 They did not challenge the adequacy of education in
Minnesota. "In fact, the parties conceded that all plaintiff districts met or exceeded the
educational requirements of the state."153 Rather, they alleged that the current system
violated the state's educationl54 and equal protection clausesl55ciause because it failed to
provide all students with equal educational opportunity .156
On appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court found that neither clause was violated.
First, after examining the wording in the education clause and comparing Minnesota's
clause to those of other states, the court found that the plaintiffs had failed to show that the
system was inadequate. Furthermore, according to the court the language of the education
clause (which called for a "general and uniform" system of schools) did not require total
funding equalization.157 Secondly, the court found no violation of state equal protection.
although the court agreed with the lower court's holding that education was a fundamental
right in Minnesota, the supreme court found the fundamental right to education did not
mean that there was a fundamental right to a particular funding scheme.158 In this case,
the court found that the rational relationship test, not the strict scrutiny test should be used
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to evaluate the funding scheme. Using this Jess stringent test, the court found that the
school finance scheme was rationally related to a legitimate state purpose. 15 9 Like many
other courts that have upheld school financing systems, the Skeen court was nonetheless
careful not to endorse the status quo and encouraged attempts to improve the system.1 60
Tennessee Small School Systems v. McWherter, 851 S.W. 2d 139 (Ten. 1993)
This case reached the Tennessee Supreme Court after years of court battles. The
original complaint in this case was filed on July 7, 1988.161 The complaint alleged that
education was a fundamental right in the State of Tennessee, but that the state had deprived
children of that fundamental right because its school financing system was unjust.

The

complaint also alleged violations of the state equal protection and education clauses.162
The trial court had ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, but the appellate court reversed.163
The Tennessee Supreme Court determined that the essential issue in the case was
"quality and equality of education," not "equality of funding."164 The court found that the
Tennessee system for funding public schools was invalid according to all three types of
equal protection analysis equal protection test, including the rational relationship test.165
The plaintiffs in this case had argued that school financing was related to the legitimate
interest of local control. The court found that argument unacceptable and concluded that
"the better reasoned opinions are those which have rejected the argument that local control
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is justification for disparity in opportunity."166

Because the court found that the state

school financing system was unconstitutional under the equal protection clause, the court
felt that it did not need to detennine "the precise level of education mandated" under the
education clause.167 Based on these conclusions, the Tennessee Supreme Court reversed
the holding of the court of appeals and remanded the case for trial. 168
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Comparison and Contrast Through the Use of Tables
Evaluating school finance cases through comparison and contrast is especially
useful because in school finance cases there are many points of similarity as well as
numerous individual nuances that make each case unique. Because of the length of the
some decisions, the complexity of the issues involved and the great number of cases, a side
by side evaluation of cases is a difficult challenge. The following tables (Table 4, Table 5
and Table 6) attempt to meet that challenge by focusing on brief, but specific points of
comparison.
Table 4 attempts to get to the heart of the plaintiffs' arguments by examining the
particular clauses that were challenged by the plaintiffs. The table indicates whether the
plaintiffs challenged a state's equal protection clause, a state's education clause, or both
clauses. It follows the continuation of challenges to both types of clauses from 1973 to
1993.
Table 5 highlights the "education clause" language from each state's constitution, as
it read in 1993. Not only is direct comparison of constitutional language made possible by
this table, the table also evaluates the strength of the individual state education clauses and
indicates whether education has been declared a fundamental right in the particular state.
(While courts have been major source for declaring education a fundamental state right,
some states have addressed this issue by voting or through other means. Such instances
are noted in the table.)
Table 6, like Table 5, also touches upon the purported strength of the state's
education clause, but Table 6 also evaluates the cases' outcomes. It demonstrates which
state system were upheld and which were invalidated during the 1973 to 1993 period. It
also serves as proof of the continuation of efforts to resolve school finance problems in the
state court system, more than twenty years after the Rodriguez decision.
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Table 4- State Constitutinal Clauses Challenged After the Rodriguez Decision
EQUAL PROTECTION
CLAUSE
CHALLENGED

EDUCATION
CLAUSE
CHALLENGED

1973

Miliken v. Green, 390 Mich. 389, 212
N.W. 2d 711 (1973)
Robinson v. Cahill, 62 NJ. 473, 303 A.2d
273 (1973)
Shofstall v. Hollins, 110 Ariz. 88, 515
P.2d 590 (1973)

v
v
v

v

v

v

1974

Northshore School District No, 417 v.
Kinear, 84 Wash.2d 685, 530 p.2d 178
(1974)
1975

v

Thompson v. Engelking, 96 Idaho 793,
537 P.2d 635 (1975)
1976

Olsen v. State, 276 Or.9, 554 P.2d 139
(1976)
People ex. rel. Jones v. Adams, 40 Ill.
App.3d 189, 350 N.E.2d 767 (1976)
Robinson v. Cahill, 69 N.J. 449, 355 A.
2d 129 ( 1976)
Serrano v. Priest, 18 Cal. 3d 729, 557
p .2d 929 (1976)

v
v
v
v

v
v

1977

Horton v. Meskill, 376 A. 2d 359 (1977)

v

1978
Seattle School Dist. No. 1 v. State, 90
Wash. 2d 476, 585 P.2d 71 (1978)

v
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Table 4- State Constitutina] Clauses Challenged After the Rodriguez Decision (Cont.)

EQUAL PROTECTION
CLAUSE
CHALLENGED

EDUCATION
CLAUSE
CHALLENGED

1979

v

v
v
v

v

v

Levittown Union Free School Dist. v.
Nyquist, 57 N.Y.S. 2d 27, 453 N.Y.S.2d
643, 439 N.E. 2d 359
McDaniel v. Thomas, 248 Ga. 632, 285
S.E. 2d 156 (1981)
1982

v
v

v
v

Board of Education v. Nyquist, 57 N.Y.2d
27, 439 N.E. 2d 369 (1982)
Lujan v. Colorado State Board of Educ.,
649 P.2d 1005 (Colo. 1992)

v
v

v
v

v
v

v
v

Board of Education v. Walter, 58 Oh.St. 2d
368, 390 N.E.2d 813 (1979)
Danson v. Casey, 484 Pa. 415, 399 A 2d
360 (1979)
Pauly v. Kelly 162 W.Va. 672, 255S.E. 2d
859 (1979)
1980
Washakie County School Dist. No. 1 v.
Herschler, 606 P.2d 310 (Wyo. 1980)

v

1981

1983

Dupree v. Alama School Dist. No. 30, 279
Ark. 340, 651 S.W.2d 90 (1983)
Hornbeck v. Somerset County Board of
Education, 295 Md. 597, 458 S.2d 758
(1983)
1984

East Jackson Public Schools v. State, 133
Mich. APP. 132, 348 N.W. 2D 303 (1984)
Pauley v. Bailey,174 W.Va. 167, 324 S.E.
2d 128 (1984)

v
NIA

NIA

.
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Table 4- State Constitutinal Clauses Challenged After the Rodriguez Decision (Cont.)
EQUAL PROTECTION
CLAUSE
CHALLENGED

EDUCATION
CLAUSE
CHALLENGED

1985

v

Horton v. Meskill, 187 Conn. 187, 486
A.2d 1099 (1985)
1986

Serrano v. Priest, 226 Cal. Rptr. 584 (Cal.
App. 1986)
1987

N/A

N/A

v
v

Britt v. North Caolina State Board of
Education. 86 N.C. App. 282, 357 S.E.2d
432, app. dismissed 361 S.E.2d 71 (1987)
Fair School Finance Council v. State, 746
P.2d 1135 (Okla. 1987)
1988

Richland County v. Campbell, 294
346, 364 S.E. 2d 470 (1988)

s.c.

v

v

v
v
v

v
v
v
v

1989

Edgewood Independent School District v.
Kirby, 777 S.W. 2d 391 (Tex. 1989)
Helena Elementary School District No. 1
v. State, 236 Mont. 44, 769 bP.2d 684
(1989)
Kukor v. Grover, 148 Wis.2d 469, 436
N.W.2d 568 (1989)
Rose v. Council for Better Education, 790
S.W. 2d 186 (Ky. 1989)
1990

Abbott v. Burke, 119 N.J. 287, 575 A.2d
359 (1990)

v
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TabIe 4 - State Consti tutinal Clauses Challenged After the Rodriguez Decision (Cont.)

EQUAL PROTECTION
CLAUSE
CHALLENGED

EDUCATION
CLAUSE
CHALLENGED

..;

..;

NIA

NIA

NIA

NIA

NIA

NIA

..;
..;
..;
..;

..;
..;
..;
..;

1991

Coalition for Equitable School Funding v.
State. 311 Or. 300, 811 P.2d 116 (1991)
Edgewood Independent School District v.
Kirby, 804 S.W. 2d 491 (Tex. 1991)
1992

Butt v. State, 4 Cal. 4th 668, 842 P.2d
1240 (1992)
Carrollton-Farmers Branch Independent
School District v. Edgewood Independent
School District, 826 s.w. 2d 489
(Tex.1992)

1993
Alabama Coalition for Equity v. Hunt, 624
So. 2d 107 (Ala. 1993)
Gould v. Om, 244 Neb. 163, ~ N.W.2d
349 (1993)
Claremont School District v. Governor,
138 N.H. 183, 635 A.2d 1375 (1993)
Idaho Schools for Equal Educational
Opportunity v. Evans, 123 Idaho 573, 850
P.2d 724 (1993)
McDuffy v. Secretary of Executive Office
of Education, 415 Mass. 545, 615 N.E.2d
516 (1993)
Reform Educational Financing Inequities
Today (R.E.F.l.T.) v. Cuomo, 199
A.D.2d. 488, 606 n.Y. S. 2d 44 (1993)
Skeen v. State, 505 N.W. 2d 299 (Minn.
1993)
Tennessee Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter,
851 S.W.2d 139, (1993)

..;
..;

..;

..;
..;

..;
..;
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Tab]e 5 - State Constitutional Clauses That
Established Public Schools (As They Looked In 1993)
Category I

exacts the minimum educational obligation upon a state; generally the mere
creation or establishment of schools
Category II
is a higher standard than Category I; it requires that states meet some
minimum standard of quality
Categoryy III contains a preamble which may set forth the purpose of education in the
state and a]so employs a "stronger and more specific education mandate"
Category IV exacts the highest form of educational obligation upon a state; often
describes education as "fundamenta1," "paramount," or "primary"
{These categories were established in the following article: William E. Thro, "To Render
Them Safe: The Ana1ysis of State Constitutional Provisions in Public Schoo] Finance
Reform Litigation," 75 Va. L. Rev. 1639, 1661-1670 (1989).}
F
NF
NR

Fundamental -Educational is a fundamental right in the state.
Not Fundamental - Education is not a fundamental right in the state.
No Ruling - There is no state ruling as to the fundamentality of education.
Courts have either ( 1) not had the opportunity to examine the issue; or (2)
refused to rule on the fundamentality of education.
"The Legislature shall establish, organize and maintain a liberal
system of public schools throughout the state for the benefit of the
children thereof between the ages of seven and twenty-ones years."

*

F

"The legislature shall by general law establish and maintain a system
AK Art. VII,§ 1 of
public schools open to all children of the State, and may provide

I

NR

I

F

II

NR

AL

Art. XIV,
§ 256;

AZ

Art. XI,§ 1

for other public educational institutions ... "
"The Legislature shall enact such laws as shall provide for the
establishment and maintenance of a general and uniform public school
svstem ...
"The state shall maintain a general, suitable and efficient system of
free schools whereby all persons in the State between the ages of six
and twenty-one years may receive gratuitous instruction."
II

AR

Art. XIV,
§1

CA

Art. IX,§ 1

co

Art.IX, § 2

CT

Art.VII,§ 1

DE

Art. X, § 1

FL

Art. IX,§ 1

"A general diffusion of knowledge and intelligence being essential to
the preservation of the rights and liberties of the people, the III
Legislature shall encourage by all suitable means the promotion of
intellectual, scientific, moral and agricultural improvement"
"The genral assembly shall, as soon as practicable, provide for the
establishment and maintenance of a thorough and uniform system of II
free public schools, throughout the state, wherein all residents of the
state, between the ages of six and twenty-one years, may be educated
gratuitouslv."
"There shall be free public elementary and secondary schools in the
state. The general assembly shall implement this principle by I
annropriate legislation.•
"The General Assembly shall provide for the establishment and
maintenance of a general and efficient system of free public schools, III
and may require that every child, not physically or mentally disabled,
shall attend the pubic school, unless educated by other means."
"Adequate provision shall be made by law for a uniform system of
II
free public schools."

F

NF

F
NR

NR
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"The provision of an adequate public education for the citizens shall
IV NF
be a primary obligation of the State of Georgia."
"The State shall provide for the establishment, support and control of
X, § 1
I NR
a statewide svstem of public schools ... "
"[I]t shall be the duty of the legislature of Idaho to establish and
IX,§ 1 maintain a general, uniform and thorough system of public, free II NF
common schools."
"A fundamental goal of the People of the State is the educational
X, § 1
development of all persons to the limits of their capacities. The IV NF
State shall provide for an efficient system of high quality public
education institutions and services. Education in public schools
through the secondary level shall be free. There may be such other
free education a<> the General Assemblv provides bv law."
"Knowledge and learning, generally diffused throughout a community,
VIII, § 1 being
III NR
essential to the preservation of a free government; it shall be
the duty of the General Assembly to encourage, by all suitable
means, moral, intellectual, scientific, and agricultural improvement;
and to provide, by law, for a general and uniform system of Common
Schools, wherin tuition shall be without charge, and equally open to
all.
"The general assembly shall encourage, by all suitable means, the
IX, 2d, promotion of intellectual, scientific, moral, and agricultural III NR
improvement."

GA Art.VII,§ 1
HI

Art.

ID

Art.

IL

Art.

**

IN

Art.

It

IA

Art.
§3

"The legislature shall provide for intellectual, educational, vocational
I NR
and scientific improvement by establishing and maintaining public
schools."
"The General Assembly shall, by appropriate legislation, provide for
KY § 183
II
F
an efficient svstem of common schools throughout the State."
"The legislature shall provide for the education of the people of the
LA Art. VII,§ 1 state and shall establish and maintain a public educational svstem."
I NR
"A general diffusion of the advantages of education being essential to
ME Art.VII, pt.
the preservation of the rights and liberties of the people; to promote IV NR
this important object, the Legislature are authorized, and it shall be
1, § 1
their duty to require, the several towns to make suitable provision, at
their own expense, for the support and maintenance of public
schools ... "
"The General Assembly ... shall by law, establish throughout the state
MD Art.VIII,§ 1 a thorough and efficient svstem of free public schools."
II NF
"[l]t shall be the duty of the legislatures and magistrates, in all future
MA Pt.2, Ch. 5, periods of this commonwealth, to cherish the interests of literature III NR
and the sciences, and all the seminaries of them ... public schools and
§2
grammar schools in the towns."
"the means of education shall forever be encouraged" and "[e]very
IV NR
MI Art.VII,
school district shall provide for the education of its pupils without
discrimination."
§§ 1, 2

KS

Art.IV,§ 1

MN Art. XIII,
§1

MS

Art. 8, § 201

"The stability of a republican form of government depending mainly
F
upon the intelligence of the people, it is the duty of the legislature to II
establish a general and uniform system of public schools. The
legislature shall make such provisions by taxation or otherwise as
will secure a thorough and efficient system of public schools
throughout the state."
"The Legislature shall, by general law, provide for the establishment,
maintenance and support of free public schools upon such conditions II NR
and limitations as the Legislature may prescribe." (Inserted into the
***
Constitution on December 4, 1987.)
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MO Art. IX,

§ l(a)
Mf Art. X, § 1

NB Art. VII,§ I
NV Art. XI,§ 2

NH Pt. 2, 83

NJ

Art. VIII,§ 4

NM Art. XII,§ I

NY Art. XI,§ 1

NC Art. IX,§ 2
ND Art.VII,§ I

OH Art. VI,§ 3

"A general diffusion of knowledge and intelligence being essential to
IV
the preservation of the rights and liberties of the people, the general
assembly shall establish and maintain free public schools for the
gratuitous instruction of all persons in this state within ages not in
excess of twenty-one years as prescribed by law."
"( 1)It is the goal of the people to establish a system of education
which will develop the full educational potential of each person. II
Equality of educational opportunity is guaranteed to each person of
the state. (2) The state recognizes the distinct and unique cultural
heritage of the American Indians and is committed in its educational
goals ti the preservation of their cultural heritage. (3) The legislature
shall provide a basic system of free quality public elementary and
secondary schools.
The legislature may provide such other
educational institutions, public libraries, and educational programs as
it deems desirable. It shall fund and distribute in an equitable manner
to the school districts the state's share of the cost of the basic
elementarv and secondary school system."
"The Legislature shall provide for the free instruction in the common
I
schools of this state of all persons between the ages of five and
twenty-one years."
"The legislature shall provide for a uniform system of common
III
schools ... "
"Knowledge and learning, generally diffused through a community,
IV
being essential to the preservation of a free government; and
spreading the opportunities and advantages of education through the
various parts of the country, being highly conducive to promote this
end; it shall be the duty of the legislators and magistrates, in all
future periods of government, to cherish the interest of literature and
the sciences, and all seminaries and public schools, to encourage
private and public institutions ... "
" The legislature shall provide for the maintenance and support of a
II
thorough and efficient system of free public schools"
"A uniform system of free public schools sufficient for the education
I
of, and open to, all the children of school age in the state shall be
established and maintained."
"The legislature shall provide for the maintenance and support of a
I
system of free common schools, wherein all the children of this state
may be educated."
"The people have a right to the privilege of education, and it is the
I
duty of the State to guard and maintain that right."
"A high degree of intelligence, patriotism, integrity and morality on
II
the part of every voter in a government and the prosperity and
happiness of the people, the legislative assembly shall make
provision for the establishment and maintenance of a system of
public schools which shall be open to all children of the state of
North Dakota and free from sectarian control. This legislative
requirement shall be irrevocable without the consent of the United
States and the people of North Dakota."
"Provisions shall be made by law for the organization, administration
II
and control of the public school system of the state supported by
public funds: provided, that each school district embraced wholly or
in part within any city shall have the power by referendum vote to
determine for itself the number of members and organization of the
district board of education, and provision shall be made by law for the
exercise of this nower by such school districts."

NR

F

NR
NR
NR

F
NR
NR
NF
NR

NR
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"The legislature shall establish and maintain a system of free public
OK Art. XII,§ 1 schools
wherein all the children of the State mav be educated"

I

NR

"The Legislative Assembly shall provide by law for the establishment
of a uniform, and general svstem of Common schools."
"The General Assembly shall provide for the maintenance of a
PA Art. III, § 14 thorough and efficient system of education to serve the needs of the
Commonweal th"
"The diffusion of knowledge, as well as of virtue among the people,
RI Art. XII,§ 1 being
essential to the preservation of their rights and liberties, it shall
be the duty of the general assembly to promote public schools and
public libraries, and to adopt all means which it may deem necessary
and proper to secure to the people the advantages and opportunities of
education and public library services."
"The General Assembly shall provide for the maintenance and support
SC Art. 11, § 3 of
a system of free public schools open to all children in the State and
shall establish, organize and support such other public institutions of
learning, as mav be desirable."
"The stability of republican form of government depending on the
SD Art.VII,§ 1 morality
and intelligence of the people, it shall be the duty of the
Legislature to establish and maintain a general and uniform system of
public schools wherein tuition shall be without charge, and equally
open to all; and to adopt all suitable means to secure to the people
the advantages and oooortunities of education."
"The State of Tennessee recognizes the inherent value of education
TN Art. XI,§ 12 and
encourages its support. The General Assembly shall provide for
the maintenance, support, and eligibility standards of a system of free
schools."
"A general diffusion of knowledge being essential to the preservation
TX Art. VII,§ 1 of
the liberties and rights of the people, it shall be the duty of the
Legislature of the State to establish and make suitable provision for
the support and maintenance of an efficient system of public free
schools."
"The Legislature shall provide for the establishment and maintenance
UT Art.X, § 1
of the state's education systems including: (a) a public education
system, which shall be open to all the children of the state and (b) a
higher education system. Both systems shall be free from sectarian
control."
"Laws for the encouragement of virtue and prevention of vice and
VT Ch.2, § 68
immorality ought to be constantly kept in force, and duly executed;
and a competent number of schools ought to be maintained in each
town unless the general assembly permits other provisions for the
convenient instruction of vouth."
"The General Assembly shall provide for a system of free public
VA Art. XII, §1 elementary and secondary schools for all children of school age
throughout the Commonwealth, and shall seek to ensure that an
educational program of high quality is established and continually
maintained."
"It is the paramount duty of the state to make ample provision for the
WA Art. IX,§ 1 education of all children residing within its borders, without
distinction or oreference on account of race, color, caste, or sex."
"The legislature shall provide, by general law, for a thorough and
WV Art. XII,§ 1 efficient svstem of free schools."
"The legislature shall provide by law for the establishment of district
WI Art. X, § 3
schools, which shall be as nearly uniform as practicable; and such
schools shall be free and without charge for tuition to all children
between the ages of 4 and 20 vears."

II

NF

II

NR

OR

Art. 8, § 3

III NR

I

NR

III NR

II

NR

II

NR

I

NR

I

NR

II

F

IV NR
II

F

II

NR
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WY Art.7, § 1

"The legislature shall provide for the establishment and maintenance
of a complete and uniform system of public instruction, embracing
free elementarv schools of everv needed kind and irrade... "

II

F

*Thro evaluated Alabama's education clause as a "I," but the language of the clause was
subsequently changed and in 1993 education was declared a fundamental right in Alabama.
**Illinois rejected the fundamentality of education in a 1993 vote to ammend the state
constitution, not in a court decision.
***At the time the evaluations of these clauses was set, Mississppi's relativley new clause
had not yet been considered by the authors who established this system of evaluation.
Based upon their qualifications,however, Mississippi's education clause appears to have
been approximatley a II.
Source: Lexis Computer Services, 1995.
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Table 6 - Results Of School Finance Challenges
Year and Case

Citation

Strength
of Education
Cla use

Finance
System
1p e Id
Uh

390 Mich. 389
212 N.W. 2d 711
62 N.J. 473
303 A.2d 273
110 Ariz. 88
515 P.2d 590

Very Strong

v'

Finance
System
I nval"d
1

1973
Miliken v. Green
Robinson v. Cahill
Shofstall v. Hollins

v'

Moderate
Moderate

v'

Very Strong

v'

Moderate

v'

Moderate

v'
v'

1974
Northshore Sch. Dist. 84 Wash.2d 685
No. 417 v. Kinear
530 P.2d 178

1976
Thompson v. Engelking

96 Idaho 793
537 P.2d 635

1976
Olsen v. State

276 Or.9
554 P.2d 139
People ex. rel. Jones v. 40 Ill. App.3d 189
Adams
350 N.E.2d 767
Robinson v. Cahill
69 N.J. 449
355 A. 2d 129
Serrano v. Priest
18 Cal. 3d 729
557 P.2d 929

Very Strong
Moderate

v'
v'

Strong

1977
1978
Seattle School Dist. No. 90 Wash. 2d 476
585 P.2d 71
I v. State

v'

Very Strong

1979
Board of Education V. 58 Oh.St. 2d 368
390 N.E.2d 813
Walter
484 Pa. 415
Danson v. Casey
399 A. 2d 360

Moderate
Moderate

v'
v'
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Year and Case

Citation

Strength
of Education
Clause

Finance
System
Upheld

Finance
System
Invalid

1980
Washakie
County 606 P.2d 310 (Wyo.
School Dist. No. 1 v. 1980)
Herschler

Moderate

J

1981
McDaniel v. Thomas

248 Ga. 632
285 S.E. 2d 156

Very Strong

J

57N.Y.2d27
439 N.E. 2d 369
649 P.2d 1005
(Colo. 1992)

Minimal

J
..;

1982
Bd. of Educ. v. Nyquist
Lujan v. Colorado State
Board of Educ.

Moderate

1983
Dupree v. Alama School 279 Ark. 340
Dist. No. 30
651S.W.2d90
Hornbeck v. Somerset
295 Md. 597
County Bd. of Educ.
458 S.2d 758

..;

Minimal
Moderate

...;

Very Strong

..;

1984
East Jackson Public
Schools v. State
Pauley v. Bailey

133 Mich. Ap. 132
348 N. W. 2d 303
174 W.Va. 167
324 S.E. 2d 128

..;

Moderate

1985
Horton v. Meskill

187 Conn. 187
486 A.2d 1099

Minimal

...;

226 Cal. Rptr. 584
(Cal. App. 1986)

Strong

..;

357 S.E.2d 432
app. dismissed 361
S.E.2d 71 (1987)
746 P.2d 1135
(Okla 1987)

Minimal

..;

Minimal

..;

1986
Serrano v. Priest

1987
Britt v. North Carolina
State Bd. of Educ. 86
N.C. Aon. 282
Fair School Finance
Council v. State
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Year and Case

Citation

Strength
of Education
Clause

Finance
System
Upheld

294 s.c. 346
364 S.E. 2d 470

Minimal

v'

Edgewood Independent
School District v. Kirby

777 S.W. 2d 391
(Tex. 1989)

Moderate

Helena Elementary
School District No. 1 v.
State
Kukor v. Grover

236 Mont. 44
769 P.2d 684

Moderate

148 Wis.2d 469
436 N. W.2d 568
790 S. W. 2d 186
(Ky. 1989)

Moderate

Finance
System
Invalid

1988
Richland County v.
Camobell

1989

Rose v. Council for
Better Education

v'

Moderate

1990
1991
Coalition for Equitable
Sch. Funding v. State.
311 Or. 300
Edgewood Indep. Sch.
Dist. v. Kirby

811 P.2d 116
(1991)

Moderate

804 s.w. 2d 491
(Tex. 1991)

Moderate

Butt v. State

4 Cal. 4th 668
842 P.2d 1240

Strong

Carrollton-Farmers
Branch Indep. Sch. Dist.
v. Edgewoodlndep.
Sch.Dist.

826 S.W. 2d 489
(Tex.1992)

1992
Not
Determined

(1992)

Moderate

v'
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Year and Case

Finance
System
Upheld

Citation

Strength
of Education
Clause

Alabama Coalition for
Equity v. Hunt

624 So. 2d 107
(Ala. 1993)

Minimal

Claremont School
District v. Governor

138 N.H. 183
635 A.2d 1375
(1993)
244 Neb. 163
506 N. W.2d 349
(1993)
123 Idaho 573
850 P.2d 724
(1993)
415 Mass. 545
615 N.E.2d 516
(1993)
199 A.D.2d. 488
606 N.Y. S. 2d 44
( 1993)
505 N. W. 2d 299
(Minn. 1993)

Very Strong

Not
Determined

Minimal

-v'

Moderate

-v'

Finance
System
Invalid

1993

Gould v. Orrr

Idaho Schools for Equal
Educational Opportunity
Y. Evans
McDuffy v. Secretary of
Executive Office of
Education
Reform Educ. Financing
Inequities Today
(R.E.F.I.T.) v. Cuomo
Skeen v. State

-v'

-v'

Strong

Minimal

-v'

Moderate

v

The strength of education c1auses used in this table (Table 6) correspond to the William E.
Thro rankings in the previous table (Table 5.) The clauses have been determined as
follows: Minimal= 1; Moderate= 2; Strong= 3, Very Strong= 4.

CHAPfERV
CONCLUSIONS
Introduction
This last chapter begins by offering evidence of continuing inequities in urban,
suburban and rural communities. It then notes that in 1993 courts continued to be aware
of these inequities.

Next, the chapter examines the roles of both the courts and the

education community in working toward a solution to education finance problems. It also
suggests possible routes to successful change in school finance litigation.

Finally, the

"Summary" outlines the basic structure of the entire work is briefly summarized and
"Recommendations for Future Research" are offered.
Inequities Continue to Exist
Inequities in Urban and Suburban Schoo] Financing Systems
Jonathan Kozol's Savage Inequalities: Children in America's Schools
In 1992, Jonathan Kozol captured the attention of the nation with his book Savage
Inequalities: Children in America's Schools.

Perhaps surprisingly, the subject of this

National Book Critics Circle Nominee and best seller was the same topic the United States
Supreme Court found so difficult to digest--school finance.

Kozol's work ambitiously

attempted to take a very difficult topic and present it in a manner that would be accessible
to a large audience. Kozol succeeded in doing so by emphasizing the effects of inequitable
school finance policies, rather than the complicated formulas that comprised those policies.
The events in KozoJ's book took place from 1988 to 1991 and were sadly
reminiscent of the facts in 1968 in San Antonio that spurred the Rodriguez case. Kozol
visited both property-wealthy and property-poor districts across the country in cities and
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towns such as East St. Louis, Chicago, New York, and Camden. He sat in classrooms,
examined buildings, observed neighborhood conditions, and spoke to children, parents,
and teachers.
In Savage Inequalities, Kozol made no attempt to deny his strong perspective or to
make his own position subtle.
Flags in these poor and segregated schools hang motionless and gather
dust, often in airless rooms and they are frequently no cleaner than the
schools themselves. Children in a dirty school are asked to pledge
allegiance to a dirtier flag. What they learn of patriotism is not clear. I
The crowding of children into insufficient, often squalid spaces [schools]
seems an inexplicable anomaly in the United States. Images of
spaciousness and majesty, of endless plains and soaring mountains, fill our
folklore and our music and the anthems that our children sing. "This land
is your land," they are told; and in one of the patriotic songs that children
truly love because it summons up so well the goodness and the optimism of
the nation at its best, they sing of "good" and "brotherhood" from "sea to
shining sea." It is a betrayal of the best things that we value when poor
children are obliged to sing these songs in storerooms and coat closets. 2
Consequently, at times, Kozol's story of oppression as dramatic as the one found in Cecil
B. DeMille's The Ten Commandments.
Nevertheless, behind the drama was indeed a serious picture.

Kozol wrote of

Clark Junior High School in East Saint Louis, Illinois:
[It] is regarded as the top school in the city ... Even here there is a disturbing
sense that one has entered a backwater of America .. .In a mathematics class
of30, children are packed into a space that might be adequate for 15... Four
of the 14 ceiling lights are broken .. .In a seventh grade social studies class,
the only book that bears some relevance to black concems---its title is "The
American Negro"--bears a publication date of 1967... [Referring to Dr.
Martin Luther King's "I Have A Dream Speech," a student says:] "Don't
tell students in this school about 'the dream.' Go and look into a toilet here
if you would like to know what life is like for students in this city." Before
I leave, I do as [the boy] asked and enter a boy's bathroom. Four of the
six toilets do not work. The toilet stalls, which are eaten away by red and
brown corrosion, have no doors. The toilets have no seats. One has a
rotted wooden stump. There are no paper towels and no soap. Near the
door there is a loop of wire with an empty toilet -paper roll.

1
Jonathan Kozol, Savage Inequalities: Children in America's Schools (New York:
Harper Perennial, 1992): 173.
2
Jonathan Kozol, Savage Inequalities: Children in America's Schools (New York:
Harper Perennial, 1992): 159.
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In Savage Inequalities, Kozo] insisted that even he was shocked by such conditions and at

first thought that the situation in East St. Louis had to be atypical, but as the book
progressed, Kozol went on to point out similar deplorable conditions in other parts of the
United States.
Kozol was not alone in documenting these inequities.

A 1995 Chicago Tribune

Magazine article compared conditions at two Chicago area high schools in the early 1990s.3
Less than twenty-five miles apart, the inner city DuSable High School was a world away
from the suburban New Trier High School in terms of educational opportunity.

(See

Table 7.)

3
The article is not specific as to the exact period in which it visited the schools,
however, it appears to have been during the 1993-94 school year. As a consequence of
the timing of the visits, some of subjects interviewed in the article apparently discussed
events and situations prior to the 1993-94 school year.
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Table 7 - New Trier & Dusable High Schools: A Comparison

New Trier High School DuSable High School
Location

Winnetka, IL*

Chicago, IL

Act mean score 1992-93

25.2 (Top 1% )

14.1

Spending per pupil

$12,000

$6,000

Graduation percentage

Most years, 100%

50%

Four-year college enrollment 98%
Average per capita income

$62,000 +

Local property value

"only a handful"
More than 80% of the
student body classified as
low income
Public housing

Average teacher's salary

$21,000 more than DuSable $21,000 less than New Trier
teacher's salary
teacher's salary

Extra-curricular
opportunities

Numerous

Few

Counseling services

Abundant

Limited

Parental involvement

Parents extremely involved
and interested

Parents skeptical of school's
value; involvement lacking

Campus environment

"beautifully landscaped;"
like "an Ivy League college"

In "the shadow of the
Robert Taylor homes ...The
worst urban misery in
America"

Source: The Chicago Tribune Magazine, February 12, 1995, pp. 14-24. (lnterestlingly,
Kozol also visited schools in Chicago and Winnetka.)
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Inequities in Rural School Financing Systems
Rural communities also continued to be affected by unequal educational
opportunities. Perhaps this was because property-poor districts were even more likely to
be funded in rural regions than urban ones.4
Rural areas face a greater challenge than urban places in adequately
financing education. Equivalent educations are more expensive to provide
in rural areas, but on the average, metro counties outpace non-metro
counties in per-pupil expenditures. Rural areas have higher ratios of
professionals to pupils. Sparsely populated nonmetro counties must spend
a disproportionate percentage of their revenues transporting
students ... [even] where non-metro counties have higher per-pupil
expenditures than their metro counterparts, much of the difference goes to
provide transportation rather than to expand school curricula or student
services. 5
In addition to these uniquely rural problems, students in non-urban property poor
communities suffered from some of the same problems that afflict their city and suburban
counterparts--outdated materials, underpaid teachers and inadequate buildings.
Local property taxes were used to fund education in rural areas, just as in urban or
suburban area, but the value of the land and the ability of rural residents to tax themselves
was subject to even greater fluctuation than other non-rural residents.

For example,

"Annual incomes of farmers averaged over $62,000 in 1978, but fell to an average of only
$2,271 in 1981, $9,871 in 1984 and $5,487 in 1985... when figures are adjusted for
inflation, [1990] farm values [were] 47 percent below those of 1980"6

By the early

1990s, deflated land values made it increasingly difficult to maintain an adequate level of

4
Lewis B. Kaden, "Courts and Legislatures in a Federal System: The Case of
School Finance, "11 Hofstra L.Rev. 1205 ( 1983)
5
Bernal L.Green and Mary Jo Schneider. "Threats to Funding for Rural Schools."
Journal of Education Finance 15 (Winter 1990): 302-18.
61bid.
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educational spending.

Without some sort of assistance, poverty was m danger of

"becoming endemic in formerly prosperous areas of rural America. "7
The Courts' Continued Recognition of School Finance Problems
In Decisions
Courts continued to recognize and to be affected by school finance problems. In
1993, more school finance cases were heard than in any previous year.8

Furthermore,

though similar factual scenarios had been repeated again and again even prior to Rodriguez,
the despicable conditions in property poor districts continued to outrage and frustrate many
judges.
For example, in the 1993 case Tennessee Small School System, v. McWherter,9
Judge Lyle Reid, writing for the majority reported:
Trial testimony indicates that many schools in the poorer school districts
have decaying physical plants, and that some school buildings are not
adequately heated and have non-functioning showers, buckling floors, and
leaking roofs. School superintendents and students also testified that the
poorer school districts do not provide adequate science laboratories for the
students, even though regulations require such facilities. In fact, evidence
was adduced that some districts' laboratories are so inadequate that only
teachers use the equipment in order to 'demonstrate' lab techniques. At
other schools, the teachers buy supplies with their own money in order to
stock the labs. Still other schools engage in almost constant fundraising by
students to provide needed materials.
Similarly, the textbooks and libraries of many of the poorer school
districts are inadequate, outdated, and in disrepair. One compelling
photograph in the record depicts a library in a Hancock county school. The
library consists of only one bookcase nestled in a room containing empty
boxes, surplus furniture, a desktop copier, kitchen supplies, a bottle of
mouthwash, a popcorn machine. When asked why newer textbooks and
more functional libraries were not provided in the schools, the responsible
official stated that additional money needed for such improvements was not
available. The lack of funds in some of the plaintiffs' districts also
prevents schools in those areas from offering advanced placement courses,
state-mandated art and music classes, drama instruction, extracurricular
athletic teams, or more than one foreign language in high school. Io
7

Ibid.

8

Chris Pipho, "Fiscal Gridlock," Phi Delta Kappan 74 (February 1993): 430.

9

Tennessee Small School System, v. McWherter, 851 S.W. 2d 139 (Tenn.1993).

10

Ibid. at 145.
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This description of conditions in property poor Tennessee school districts was remarkably
similar to the descriptions of conditions in the plaintiffs briefs in the Rodriguez case.11
Twenty years later, students in property poor districts sti11 suffered the same affects-unequal educational opportunity.
And Beyond Decisions
By 1993,judges familiar with education finance cases recognized that identifying
the problems associated with unequal educational opportunity and declaring a financing
system invalid were only a tiny step towards reforming school finance. For example, in
the 1979 case Pauly v. Kelly,12 the West Virginia Supreme Court found the plaintiffs'
schools to be "woefulJy inadequate." A lower court then directed the state legislature to
devise a new system.
Education."

By 1983 the legislature had devised the "Master Plan for

It ca11ed for greater funding equity, more teachers, higher salaries, new

buildings and equipment.

"A decade later, though the unfortunate truth [was] that the

court case and the Master Plan accomplished very little." 13
Even the judges in school finance cases recognized that, despite the good
intentions, the situation did not improve. Charles Mahtesian, in the September 1993 issue
of Governing quoted West Virginia Supreme Court Justice Richard Neely on the Bailey
case, "Our case had all sorts of wonderful language in it, but it didn't amount to a bowl of
whiz."14

Unfortunately, Justice Neely's assessment was fairly accurate.

Mahtesian

reported that 18 of the 19 schools in the original Bailey suit had been recommended for

11

See plaintiffs briefs in San Antonio v. Rodriguez.

12

Pauly v. Kelly,162 W.Va. 672, 255 S.E.2d 859 (1979).

13
Charles Mahtesian, "The Quagmire of Education Finance," Governing (September
1993): 43.
14

Ibid.
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probation status. The 19th school was labeled "seriously impaired."15

Not only had

conditions remained unimproved since Bailey, they remained unimproved since Rodriguez.

Is a Solution Impossible?
The Courts' Role in Determining the Outcome of School Finance Cases
In an interview conducted ten years after the Rodriguez decision, John Coons

asserted that had the Rodriguez case been examined by the Warren Court, the result would
have been different.

He suggested that the Warren Court, with its more liberal

philosophies and potential willingness to expand fundamental rights, would have had a
different approach to the case than did the Burger Court, in 1973.16

By 1993, the

Supreme Court was generally thought to be even more conservative than it was in 1973.
Several members of the court were appointed by Ronald Reagan and George Bush, neither
of whom advocated increased federal government involvement in education.1 7
while members of the Supreme Court are not bound to follow the political

Again,

philo~hies

of

the presidents who nominate them, Supreme Court candidates are generally nominated
because their political philosophies coincide (or at the very least do not clash) with the
president's.

This idea would suggest that the Supreme Court is unlikely to reverse

Rodriguez at any time in the near future.
However, the school finance situation did not improve after the Rodriguez
decision.

In fact, most signs indicate that it has gotten worse.18

It is possible that,

should the right case come along, the Court would once again examine school finance

15

Ibid. at 43, 44.

16
"A Decade After Rodriguez: An Interview with John Coons," Phi Delta Kappan,
March 1983, 482.
17
Percy E. Burrup, Vern Brimley Jr. and Rulon R. Garfield, Financing Education in
a Climate of Change, (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1988), 211, 212.
18

See Jonathan Kozol's Savage Inequalities.
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matters. If the Court did so, however, one could be fairly certain that it would not do so
because it was eager to once again address the complicated constitutional issues involved
with school finance, but because the situation in American schools had indeed so drastically
deteriorated. The Rodriguez case demonstrated the Supreme Court's hesitation to become
involved in resolving school finance matters. Whether this hesitation was based in fear or
genuine concern for upholding the concept of the separation of powers remains unclear.
Perhaps the decision was influenced by both of these factors. One thing is fairly certain.
The twenty years following Rodriguez demonstrate that the more removed a court became
from the facts of the case, the more likely it was to uphold the constitutionality of the state's
financing system--even in the face of great funding disparities.
Unlike the appellate courts, or the state supreme courts, which dealt with the more
abstract issues of constitutionality and school financing, the trial courts assessed the facts
of the case.1 9
What distinguish[ed] these trial judges [was] simply that they took the time
to understand how school finance systems operate. Two conclusions were
inescapable: that these systems allocated educational resources among
districts on factors that [had] nothing to do with education and that
educational opportunities [were] the result of the happenstance of where a
child live[d].20
Thus, confronted with these harsh inequalities, the trial courts often found for the plaintiffs
who had challenged the financing systems.
The Education Community's Role in Determining the Outcome of School Finance Cases
Not all of the blame for the lack of improvement in the school financing situation
should be placed on the courts. The courts can only judge the facts and determine the
issues that are placed before it.

The education finance community, indeed the entire

education community, needs to put forth a united front, if it is to be successful in court. In

19
David C. Long, "Rodriguez: The State Courts Respond," Phi Delta Kappan,
March 1983, 482.

20

Ibid.
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Rodriguez, a1though all of the plaintiffs wanted to abolish the school financing system,
many also had their own agendas that alienated them from their fellow plaintiffs.21

The

lawyers for the state of Texas were perceptive enough to point out this division to the
Supreme Court. Surely, this lack of unity did not help the plaintiffs' case.

Education

finance reformers need to formulate a plan that focuses on factors about which there is
agreement, if they ever hope to succeed in court.
Scholars must come to some form of consensus before they demand that the courts
do the same.

Even those holding opposing views in Rodriguez were able to reach a

consensus about some aspects of education:
1.

Education is important.

2.

Local control is important.

3.

Not all children receive equal educational opportunity.

Education finance leaders need to examine these and other potential points of agreement in
order to achieve their goals of equal educational opportunity for all.

Finding an Answer
The United States' Historic Interest in Education
Enemies and Goals
As this dissertation has pointed out repeatedly, there is no federal constitutional
commitment to education. Education is a state matter and each state may determine its own
education system; however, this does not mean that there is no national interest in
education.

The Justices in the Rodriguez majority, as well as in the dissent, noted,

perhaps even with pride, the Supreme Court's historic interest in education. Likewise, at
certain times in United States history, the federal government, as a whole, has shown an
interest in national education policy.

"A Decade After Rodriguez: An Interview with John Coons," Phi Delta Kappan,
March 1983, 482.

21
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In the United States, a national interest in education has typically coincided with
periods of crisis or change. During the 1973-93 period, the classic example of the federal
government's interest in education was the federal government's call for increased science
and math courses after the Soviet Union launched Sputnik in 1957.22 At that time, the
Soviets' capabilities and the United States' relative inadequacies in math and science were
seen as a threat to United States security. 23 Other examples exist as well. For example,
the development of the American high school coincided with the changes that took place in
the workforce due to the industrial revolution.24 In the 1940s, the national government
took steps to guard against massive unemployment after World War II by financiaJly
assisting veterans through the 1944 G.I. Bill of Rights.25
At these times in United States history, the country had, if not an enemy, a at least a
goal. If education finance reform is ever to take place in the United States (either through
state-by-state reforms or in one centralized national movement) reformers need to uncover
an enemy or to focus on a goal. An enemy need not be external. In fact, from 1973 to
1993, the United States struggled with several internal enemies. These enemies included
crime, violence, poverty and homelessness. Although many educators have been trained
to see the relationship between these internal enemies and equal educational opportunity,
other citizens, including judges, may not have been so trained and may need convincing.
Finding a goal has been a source of greater difficulty. In the period from 1973 to
1993, as multicultural awareness increased and political correctness expanded, more and
more groups sought to influence education. Other more traditionally conservative groups

22
Percy E. Burrup, Vern Brimley Jr. and Rulon R. Garfield, Financing Education in
a Climate of Change, (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1988), 177.
23

Ibid.

24

Larry E. Decker, Foundations of Community Education, ( 1972).

25
Percy E. Burrup, Vern Brimley Jr. and Rulon R. Garfield, Financing Education in
a Climate of Change, (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1988), 177.
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resented these changes.2 6 Unlike other countries that have a national identity based upon
qualities or traits that are similar for all or most of the people of the country, the national
identity of the United States is founded upon independence and diversity.
This is not to say that Americans have no national consensus or identifiable
characteristics. Certainly, capitalist, sports-enthusiastic Americans are competitive, if not
by nature, then by tradition. Yet, the very quality in the American nature that makes people
shout "We're number one!" at sporting events and contests should also compel Americans
to see that there is no legitimate competition in United States schools. After all, where's
the competition when one side has a distinct disadvantage?
The Rodriguez case and the subsequent state court cases demonstrate that parents
are interested in their own children's education. Rich parents, poor parents, and midd1eclass parents want their children to have educational opportunities that will bring out their
child's own individual talents and maximize their potential for growth and learning.
Although, many parents would state, with the utmost conviction, that they want the best
education for their children, would any parent stand on record and say that his children
deserve a better education than those who live five miles away in public housing?

The

difference in the two statements may be subtle, but it is nonetheless important.
Potential Strategies for the Future
Perhaps, with the combination of the lack of improvement in school finance since
Rodriguez and the potential national crisis in education, the Supreme Court would once
again address issues surrounding school finance.

Even if the current Court will not

address these issues, perhaps a later Court would. School finance reformers need to be
ready with successful arguments should the opportunity to appear before the Court occur
once agam.

One argument that might be successful relates to the exercise of political

261n a recent New York Times article, one woman expressed her dismay with the potential
attachments to federal government moneys by indicating that if her state accepted federal
money, her children might become critical thinkers.
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Table 8- Presidential Education

President*
William McKinley

College
Allegheny College

Graduate School
Entered law school in
Albany

Theodore Roosevelt

Harvard

William H. Taft

Yale

Cincinnati Law School

Woodrow Wilson

Princeton University

Johns Hopkins (Ph.D.)

Warren G. Harding

Ohio Central College in
Iberia

Calvin Coolidge

Amherst College

Herbert C. Hoover

Stanford University

Franklin D. Roosevelt

Harvard

Columbia Law School

Harry S. Truman
Dwight E. Eisenhower

WestPoint

John F. Kennedy

Harvard

6 months of graduate school
Stanford University

Lyndon B. Johnson

Southwest Texas State

Teachers College

Richard M. Nixon

Whittier College

Duke University
Law School

Gerald R. Ford

University of Michigan

Yale Law School

James Carter

United States Naval
Academy

Ronald Reagan

Eureka College

George Bush

Yale

William Clinton

Georgetown
Oxford, Rhodes Scholar

Source: Worldbook Encyclopedia.

Yale Law School
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Such an argument need not result in the conclusion that every child who enters
public school is guaranteed a chance to become the President of the United States.

In a

College Board Review article entitled "Rich Schools, Poor Schools: The Persistence of
Unequal Education,"

Arthur E. Wise and Tamar Gendler noted that as a result of

continuing school finance inequities
it is not only potential luminaries that are lost; it is part of an entire
generation of citizens whose potential contributions are stunted by the
inadequacy of the education they are provided. School finance reform
cannot solve alJ of the problems of education, but it can equalize the
opportunities that the state provides.28
Thus, an argument for school finance reform it need not imply that every child who enters
public school will attend college, let alone a prestigious college. The argument would
simply center on the fact that educational opportunity is necessary to participate in the total
political process, not only as an active member of the governed masses, but also for the
realistic possibility to serve as an elected or appointed government official.

Because

educational opportunity is necessary, for participation in the complete political process,
where the government has accepted the responsibility to provide it, the government should
provide it to all on equal terms.
Moving Beyond Adequacy
This means forming school finance policies that go beyond adequacy.

While

children should strive to reach goals and educators might hope to produce outcomes,
working towards adequacy is a somewhat disheartening concept.

Furthermore, the

concept of adequacy as a solution to school finance questions is not without its very
practical problems.
Even Justice Thurgood Marshall, who voiced the strongest agreement with the
plaintiffs in Rodriguez, expressly denounced adequacy as a solution to educational finance

28
Arthur E. Wise and Tamar Gendler, "Rich Schools, Poor Schools: The Persistence
of Unequal Education," The College Board Review, 151 (Spring 1989): 37.
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problems.29

In Rodriguez, Marshall questioned the Court's ability to define educational

adequacy. More than twenty years later, not only had courts failed to arrive at a workable
definition of the term, even proponents of adequacy struggled with the term.
Mary Fulton, a policy analyst at the Education Commission of the States,
join[ed] a chorus of other education experts when she [said] there is no
consensus over how to define it. "You can produce a lot of data to show
inequities exist. You can show that pretty easily. Adequacy is a little
messier. "3 0
Finally, adequacy has negative connotations. Parents, regardless of their socio-economic
class, who are concerned for their children's educational well-being want the same thing
for their children: a good education. A parent with a low socio-economic status does not
want wealthy schools to spend less or "level down" so that their own schools no longer
look so poor in comparison.

They want their schools to be as good as those other

schools.
Just as Wise and Gendler wrote, a "future physician is as easily born in Jersey City
as in Princeton, a future pianist in Edgewood as Alamo Heights," (emphasis added). The
accidents of birth and geography should not determine whether a child learns to play the
violin or whether class is held in a basement, but despite years of litigation and attempted
efforts at finance reform, this continues to be the case.

"America continues to provide

unequal education to those who most need what school has to offer."3 1

29

See Marshall's dissent in San Antonio v. Rodriguez, 411 US 1, 36 L.Ed. 2d 16.

30
Charles Mahtesian, "The Quagmire of Education Finance," Governing (September
1993): 45.
31
Arthur E. Wise and Tamar Gendler, "Rich Schools, Poor Schools: The Persistence
of Unequal Education," The College Board Review, 151(Spring1989): 12.
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Closing Remarks
From 1973 to 1993 many state courts addressed school finance issues. Most often,
the courts addressed challenges to school financing that had been brought under two state
constitutional clauses--the equal protection clause and the state education clause.
Although Rodriguez virtually eliminated the chance for the success of a federal equal
protection claim, after Rodriguez plaintiffs continued to challenge the clause in their state
constitution that resembled the federal equal protection clause. In addition, plaintiffs began
to challenge the clause in the state constitution that established education in the state. The
language of this clause differ~d from state to state and so did judicial interpretation of that
language.
The success of these challenges varied. Nonetheless, plaintiffs continued to look
to the courts for guidance, if not solutions, to the problems associated with unequal
educational opportunity. The state courts attempted to address the complex issues of
school finance as best they could, given their limited background and experience in such
matters. At the trial level, where the facts associated with the financial disparities played a
more prominent role in the adjudication of cases, courts typically advocated a more active
judicial role, but frequently, by the time the case reached the higher courts, the facts were
secondary to issues of the law and its interpretation.
In sum, because the Supreme Court in Rodriguez declined the opportunity to take a
more active leadership role, the post-Rodriguez years were busy, but not highly productive
years for state courts. In states like Texas, California and New Jersey, essentially the
same factual scenarios were repeatedly adjudicated.

As time passed, the names of the

plaintiffs might have changed--after all, in twenty plus years many student/plaintiffs had
graduated--but with slight variations the procedures for financing schools in the United
States remained the same.
During this period school finance litigation was the Jarndyce v. Jarndyce of
American education. In the Charles Dicken's classic Bleak House, an inheritance case,
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known as Jarndyce v. Jarndyce, continues on for years in the English courts. By the time
the suit is resolved, at the end of the novel, all the inheritance money has been spent on
attorneys fees. In the United States, surely billions of do11ars have been spent arguing,
somewhat ironically, over inadequate school funding systems. This is not to imply that
the attorneys in these cases did not earn their fees, but simply to point out that, in spite of
all the costly litigation, the school finance problems that existed in 1973 still existed in
1993. The Rodriguez majority, through their inaction, at best delayed the reforms that will
be necessary to the survival of American education, and at worst exacerbated these
problems. (See Table 10.)
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Table9-Timeline
1968 Rodriguez plaintiffs file claim alleging
school district funding disparities violate
the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.

1969

1985 "Princeton, New Jersey spends $4,954
to educate a child in its public schools.
Down the road--and down the social
ladder--Patterson spends $2,674 per
child."

A three-judge District Court is
impanelled to hear the Rodriguez suit.

1986
1970
1987 The man who wrote the Rodriguez
19 71 The District Court finds in favor of the
Rodriguez plaintiffs. The case is
appealed to the United States Supreme
Court.

majority, Supreme Court Justice Lewis
F. Powell, Jr., retires from the Court as
its wealthiest member.

1988 The city of Detroit spends $3,600 yearly
on each child's education. Nearby
suburbs spend the following: Grosse
Pointe $5,700; Bloomfield Hills
$6,250; Birmingham $6,400.

1972
197 3 The United States Supreme Court
reverses the decision of the District
Court.

1989 United States govenors have a summit
meeting to discuss national educational
standards.
The wealthiest Texas school districts
outspend the poorest by a ratio of 700
to 1.

1974
1975
1976

1990 Demetrio Rodriguez's grandchildren---a

1977

girl in third grade and a boy in prekindergarten attend public schools in
Edgewood. Rodrigue predicts, "My
grandson and granddaughter will graduate
from high school and [school finance
reform] still won't be implmented."

1978
1979
1980

1991

1981

1992 Jonothan Kozol's Savage Inequalities,

1982
1983 In response to Pauly v. Kelly, West
Virginia produced the Master Plan for
Education which called improving
educatinal quality through more
teachers, higher salaries, new buildings,
etc. (Ten years later, WestVirginia
Supreme Court Justice Richard Neely s
aid, "our case had lots of wonderful
alnguage in it, but it didn't amount to a
bowl of whiz.}

which describes and humanizes the
continuing effects of inequitable school
funding is published and becomes a best
seller.

19 9 3 More states than ever have pending
school finance litigation.

1984

The information in this timetine can be found in the main body of the dissertation.
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Summary
This study has analyzed the San Antonio v. Rodriguez in detail and examined
subsequent state court decisions.

By doing do, it has pointed to the effects that the

Rodriguez decision had, not merely on the education finance policy of a single state or a
handful of states, but on the education finance scene in the nation as a whole. The
dissertation began by noting the importance of effective communication in legal educational
finance matters. Matters of school finance affect a huge range of people--from children to
teachers to taxpayers to the society at large. The effective resolution of these matters
depends on the ability to communicate effectively using terminology from law, education
and school finance.
Chapters II and III focused on the Rodriguez case.

Chapter II began by

presenting the facts that gave rise to the need for change in Texas school finance policy. It
then followed the legal trail from the District Court to the United States Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court decision was examined in its entirety, from the majority opinion
through the concurring opinions and dissents. Chapter III touched upon questions and
considerations that were not part of the formal case record, but might nonetheless have
impacted its outcome. It looked to the Justices' formal constitutional duties as well as their
life experiences.

Fina11y, it pointed out some of the legitimate concerns with making

education a fundamental right.
Chapter IV traced the state court case history that followed the Rodriguez decision.
It presented a chronological listing on state court cases and pointed out interesting or unique
aspects of certain decisions. It highlighted certain aspects of the plaintiffs' strategies in the
cases. For example, it noted how many cases stressed violations of state equal protection
and how many emphasized the state's obligation on its own clause establishing schools.
In addition the chapter presented other data relevant to school finance, such as the wording
of state education clauses or whether education was a fundamental right in the state.
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The final chapter examined where the years since the Rodriguez case have brought
the school finance movement.

It referred to Jonathan Kozol's Savage Inequalities:

Children in America's Schools and noted some of the unequal educational opportunities
that still existed in the 1990s. Finally, it offered some suggestions as to the possible future
of the school finance reform movement.
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Recommendations for Future Research
1.

Explore individual state finance histories in detail.

2.

Gather evidence as to the adult lives (careers, family situations, extent of education)

of former residents of school districts with low property value and compare them with
those of former residents of school districts with high property value.
3.

Rank states as to federal, state, and local sources of education funding. How have

the federal, state and local contributions changed over the years?
4.

Can national goals be achieved in a multicultural environment? If so, how? What

can the United States learn from other countries with stronger national education policies?
5.

What are the positions of the current Justices on educational opportunity? Do these

opinions reflect their own educational backgrounds or are they more closely related to the
political philosophies they have adopted as adults?
6.

Explore the expanding role of the school business manager as it relates to equal

educational opportunity.

Can the nation as a whole learn from the school business

manager? Can an individual school with an effective school business manager serve as an
example for the entire nation?
7.

Does municipal overburden really exist or was it just a failed theory aimed at

bringing more money into urban schools?
8.

Explore equal educational opportunity as it affects rural communities.

9.

Who are the attorneys who argue these school law cases? Do the same attorneys

travel from state to state wherever school finance cases are filed.

Is school finance

litigation a lucrative business for attorneys?
l 0.

Is formal education related to political leadership? What percentage of Congress

(the Supreme Court, Senate, state governors) attended college? Is any correlation merely
coincidental?
11.

Examine the dissenting opinions in detail. Do dissenters usually advocate change?
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